Underkill

Written by Stuart Johnson

Scalable capabilities for military
operations amid populations.

Resolving this dilemma demands options that enable U.S. forces to neutralize dangerous individuals without harming innocent ones under U.S. protection. Only with the right capabilities is it possible to protect innocent lives without jeopardizing the missions or safety of U.S. troops in the presence of enemies with hostile intent.

The challenge of carrying out dangerous missions amid populations is not confined to COIN. Peacekeepers are often interposed between warring factions. Humanitarian-relief efforts can place U.S. soldiers in contact with desperate and unruly crowds. Quelling public disorder and rounding up looters may confront U.S. troops with the need to curb violence without resorting to violence. The need to free hostages, isolate terrorists and board pirated ships with captured crews is increasing. U.S. forces may face enemy fighters who favor urban areas because such environments allow them to conceal themselves or endanger the people among whom they hide.

The growing frequency and significance of operations amid populations suggests a regular—rather than rare—need for U.S. military forces to be able to gain control of situations, perform their tasks and protect themselves short of using deadly force. Although nonlethal options have long been essential in law-enforcement missions, in which ensuring public safety with minimum violence is stock-in-trade, they have been regarded by the military as having only limited utility and then in only exceptional circumstances. Although foreign insurgents present dangers exceeding those that police face in American cities, U.S. military forces could remedy a major shortcoming they face in COIN and other key missions if they had capabilities that could produce a range of effects and the skills to use them. Such options would offer typical small units more flexibility, self-sufficiency and speed—less risk of making mistakes with wide political repercussions.

Given the nature of the missions and responsibilities of U.S. forces, being able to disable persons without killing them is insufficient. The ability to calibrate nonlethal force from none to mild to moderate to intense can be as important as simply not causing death. Likewise, having the means to disorient but not injure individuals could take the initiative away from attackers without jeopardizing the well-being, good will and future cooperation of the larger population.

The need for capabilities that range from nonviolent to lethal force is common, varied, and unpredictable, and the need for small units to act swiftly argues against having to call in capabilities from higher echelons. These factors place a premium on versatile and portable capabilities that can be carried and used by small units that operate amid populations and face uncertainty. Additionally, these capabilities should be scalable— capable of producing a range of effects, from nonharmful to extreme or even lethal—to enhance the ease and speed of escalation and de-escalation as a situation unfolds and obviate the need for awkward or time-consuming transitions from one set of equipment to another. Continuum-of-force capabilities should also be affordable enough that most small units can be equipped with them.

As with any military capability specific continuum-of-force capabilities should be based on operating requirements. A research team at RAND has examined a diverse and representative set of realistic tactical scenarios encompassing COIN, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, civil order and other conditions that small units might face. From 24 such scenarios, a number of common themes emerge:

• the prevalence of small-unit engagements and the corresponding need for junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to be able to decide in dangerous and urgent circumstances what measures to take
• partial, ambiguous, confusing or deceptive information about the identity, motivations and intentions of persons engaged
• the importance of seizing initiative from and exerting control over dangerous persons amid innocent ones
• the utility and difficulty of communicating with groups, especially large groups, of persons engaged by U.S. forces
• the likelihood of dire political ramifications if civilians are killed or hurt, claims of which are amplified by global media and distorted by enemy propagandists
• the need for relatively mild, even nonviolent, initial effects in order to gain time, information, and initiative
• the importance of rapidly scalable and portable capabilities.

These findings suggest that the problem of acting forcefully against adversaries amid populations is as much one of gaining and using knowledge as causing desired effects. Therefore, an integrated solution— part information, part judgment, and part physical capability—is needed, and has been missing so far in the search for nonlethal options. In regard to physical characteristics, four key general criteria emerged: versatility, portability, scalability and feasibility.

There is no single technology that can be employed today that by itself satisfies this general need. A combination of sound and light offer the greatest promise at present. Both can be effective in hailing, inhibiting, disorienting, disrupting or degrading the key sensory faculties of dangerous persons at a distance without necessarily causing lasting harm to them or to innocent persons. Their effects can range from mild to severe, affording users the opportunity to observe the effects of their weapons and make adjustments. As an effect’s intensity increases, enemy combatants and noncombatants may react differently, isolating the former and scattering the latter, thus reducing the number of potential targets against which to direct even harsher measures. In the future, a range of lasers that can scale from low-energy to high-energy should be able to produce effects that are even more pronounced.

Directed sound and light, including light from lasers, appear useful in many of the study’s scenarios and thus are versatile. They are sufficiently portable (on foot or in light vehicles) that platoons or squads can carry them on most missions. They do not involve physical projectiles, violent contact or inhalation, any of which could prove counterproductive if used against people whose cooperation is needed for the mission to succeed.

As part of an integrated approach, directed- energy capabilities can be complemented by an innovative communications technique involving the use of cell phones. If friendly authorities have privileged access to cellphone switches, a unit commander could request that all cell phones in a given neighborhood or congregated group of people be called to transmit simple text or audio messages that alert, warn, reassure or instruct. Even if only a fraction of those present receive the message, word would spread and the rest would learn quickly of its contents.

The continuum of force could exploit video technology as well. Vehicle-, weapon- or fixed-mounted cameras and video recordings could aid in learning lessons, adapting systems and tactics, refuting unfounded rumors and propaganda and collecting intelligence about dangerous persons. In addition, live video could help deter insurgents who don’t want their image to be captured or taped.

It is imperative to communicate early, persistently and accurately the rationale behind and facts of all aspects of a continuum of force to people who may be affected. The unifying theme of such communication must be that U.S. forces accept their duty to safeguard the people of countries where they operate and, accordingly, are depriving killers of the benefit of hiding among and harming those people. The suite of capabilities developed by the team is for the most part technologically feasible. Aspects that require development include the following:

• very-high-intensity sound that is precise, scalable, effective at long ranges (i.e., hundreds of yards), and can cause discomfort, disorientation or incapacitation
• femto-second lasers and other candidates that can cause a sensation of heat from mild to intense
• software that permits selective and instantaneous cell-phone messaging to users in a particular area
• deployable links for real-time video
  

A more serious potential problem than the feasibility of individual pieces themselves is whether the integration of the components, including important information and communications features, is feasible in the near-to-medium term. Without underestimating the associated challenges, the team judged such integration as well within the capability of the U.S. military and its system providers.

In its fullest form, then, the suite of continuum-of-force capabilities envisioned here could consist of directed sound, directed light, lasers, cell-phone communication and video observation. As a whole, this suite is remarkable in its nonkinetic character: it affects the senses and perceptions rather than the physical condition of persons engaged. This does not mean that kinetic nonlethal or lethal capabilities have no place in the range of options available to U.S. forces operating amid populations. Yet, the idea of alternatives to physical violence leads to a host of emerging technologies that offer U.S. forces ways to control situations and gain advantages over enemies without harming persons who ought not to be harmed.

To incorporate continuum-of-force capabilities into an ordinary small unit, it would be better to rely on a well-trained, experienced, specialized team-within-unit than to prepare, involve, and have to control every member of the unit. The former approach would allow the unit commander to concentrate on the essential tasks of sensing, reasoning and adapting during the operation. Placing high-powered sound, light and lasers in one light vehicle fits with the team-withinunit approach. Finally, a team-within-unit would allow most members of the unit to be concerned only with the use of deadly force, thus lowering the risk that nonlethal options might impede the use of lethal ones when required.

To adopt this approach the military will need to invest in the requisite human resources and abilities, especially:

• training and educating junior officers and NCOs in continuous sense-making and decision-making when faced with uncertainty, urgency and risk amid populations
• selecting NCOs with the temperament and aptitude for technical and behavioral aspects of the continuum.

In sum, a continuum of force for regular U.S. troops operating amid populations is needed and is possible. Scalable and portable technologies—e.g., directed sound and light—are in train or within reach. But those technologies do not provide a complete solution: the ability to prevail against dangerous enemies without harming innocent people and jeopardizing larger campaign goals depends crucially on the skill, sensitivity and preparation of U.S. soldiers. In turn, creating and mainstreaming this ability will require vision, initiative, commitment and persistence on the part of those soldiers’ civilian and military leaders. ♦

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Dr. Stuart E. Johnson is a senior research analyst at the RAND Corporation where he directs a portfolio of studies on the application of technology to emerging national security challenges. Navy Rear Admiral Raymond C. Smith, (Ret.) had a 31 year career as a SEAL and served as deputy commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The authors would also like to acknowledge important contributions to this article made by Messrs. David Gompert, Martin Libicki and David Frelinger of the RAND Corporation.

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