Q&A:Brigadier General Frank Kearney
SOCCENT Warrior
Leading the Fight in the Hot Spots: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa
Brigadier General Frank Kearney
Commander Special Operations Command-Central Command
Brigadier General Frank Kearney III graduated from the United States Military Academy in June 1976. Following the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the Ranger Course, he was assigned to the 1st Battalion (Mechanized) 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo., where he served as platoon leader, recon platoon leader, company executive officer, battalion motor officer, and commander of Alpha Company.
Following attendance at the Armor Officer’s Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Ky., He was assigned to the 2nd Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry at Fort Lewis, Wash., serving as the S5, S1 and commander of Alpha Company during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada.
Upon graduation from the Army Command and General Staff College in June 1989, Kearney returned to the Ranger Regiment’s 3rd Battalion at Fort Benning, Ga., where he served as plans officer, Battalion S3, battalion executive officer, and on the regimental staff as the liaison and plans officer. He participated in Operation Just Cause with the Rangers during this assignment. In June 1993, Brigadier General Kearney assumed command of the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 501st Infantry at Fort Richardson, Alaska, and while commanding the 1st of the 501st, was selected to command the 3rd Ranger Battalion at Fort Benning.
In July 1994, Kearney returned to the Ranger Regiment assuming command of the 3rd Ranger Battalion followed by attendance at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., graduating in June 1997. Immediately following graduation from the War College, he was assigned to Operation Joint Guard, as the chief, Joint Military Commission for Multi-National Division North in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. He commanded the SETAF Infantry Brigade in Vicenza, Italy, from March 1998 to March 2000, during which time his unit participated in support to Operations Allied Force, Joint Forge and Joint Guardian in the Balkans.
He was assigned as the J3 at the Joint Special Operations Command in April of 2000 and served until June 2002, including combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom. Kearney was the deputy commanding general for operations for the Joint Special Operations Command from July 2002 until September 2003 and participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He assumed the duties as assistant division commander (Maneuver) at Fort Riley, Kan., October 2003. He then served as deputy CFSOC commander and commander, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-Former Regime Elements in Baghdad, Iraq.
Kearney became commanding general of Special Operations Command-Central Command in March 2005.
Interviewed by Jeff McKaughan, SOTECH editor
Q: Although there are certainly military operations ongoing in other regions of the world involving U.S. special operations forces, but Central Command, your area is undoubtedly where much of the action is. Can you give us an overview of your activities and people?
A: Currently in the CENTCOM AOR the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command [CFSOCC] is engaged with approximately 7,400 coalition forces from eight nations organized into two combined joint special operations task forces [CJSOTFs], one Combined Joint Special Operations Aviation Command, one joint psychological operations task force, one Naval Special Warfare Unit and three Special Operations command and control elements [SOCCEs]. Both CJSOTF-AP [Arabian Peninsula] and CJSOTF-A [Afghanistan] include coalition partners. The number of coalition partners in Afghanistan has fluctuated from as many as 10 contributing nations to our present level of six. In CJSOTF-AP our coalition partners previously included Poland and now include the newly formed Iraqi Special Operations Forces [ISOF].
The two JSOTFs have among them conducted the full spectrum of SOF tasks since the beginning of OEF, including direct action [DA], special reconnaissance [SR], unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense [FID], civil affairs operations, information operations, psychological operations and special actions. In each JSOTF we continue to execute several SOF core tasks but the focus is now clearly on FID or partnering with the Iraqi and Afghan security forces to train, target, advise and conduct combined operations.
Building the capacity of the Iraqi Army and specifically ISOF to prosecute the counter-insurgency [COIN] has been the primary focus of the 10th and 5th Special Forces Groups [SFG], while building the same capacity in the Afghan Security Forces has been the focus of the 3rd and 7th SFGs. Elements of 1st, 19th and 20th Groups have supported significantly over the past four years as well. While the Army’s Special Forces have been the numerically dominant battlefield presence, we have continuously employed Naval Special Warfare Forces and Command and control elements in both Iraq, Afghanistan and in providing personal security [PSD] for key leaders in Iraq and previously [in] Afghanistan. SEAL platoons and task units continue to conduct DA, SR, PSD, Sniper and FID missions as part of the CJSOTFs.
We are ably supported in our ground mission by elements of AFSOC with AC-130 U/H gunships, MC-130 Talons and MH-53M helicopters providing the agile lift-and-fire support for the ground forces. Elements of the 160th SOAR round out our aviation and fire support with their full complement of assets and capability. This air-and-fire package is commanded and operated by our joint special operations aviation component, which plans, commands and controls operations throughout the AOR from multiple locations.
Lastly, the CFSOCC staff provides command and control through a complex and evolving C4I infrastructure that utilizes SOCCEs in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa to facilitate C2 with regional joint task force headquarters that USCENTCOM uses to control operations throughout their area of responsibility. Command and control is SOCCENT’s primary task. Our task organization and infrastructure support unique, dynamic and complex integration of combined SOF on multiple battlefields. Technology is a key enabler in our ability to execute our core task.
Q: Have you seen any evolution of command structure to meet the unique demands of peace building in Iraq and Afghanistan while there are still ongoing operations?
A: First, I would not use the term peace building. Our mission is two-fold: fight the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and build capability in our regional partners so they can fight and defeat terrorism throughout the region. That includes the key tasks of building Iraqi and Afghan security forces through FID, creating a SOF capability for the Iraqi Army through the ISOF brigade, and working with our regional partners to build and enhance their capability to conduct counter-terrorist operations in their own countries. Our command structures have, and will continue to evolve as the war on terror transforms from a U.S.-led coalition to coalitions led by partner nations and entities like NATO. Our SOC HQs were not designed to fight in three sub-theaters [Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa] simultaneously [while] also engaging in AOR-wide theater security cooperation as well as providing advice to the RCC and three regional joint task force commanders.
The scope of activities we find ourselves involved in today requires continual augmentation and training as well as flexibility in C2 structures. It is difficult to exert the personal influence that our military culture expects over a wide-ranging AOR without open-minded approaches to command relationships. Leveraging technological advances in C4I has enhanced our ability to work with coalition and interagency partners. Doctrinal approaches to C2 must be tempered with the dynamics of the interagency process, coalition C2 structure, and leadership styles. So you find new structures like joint interagency task forces [JIATFs] to work interagency unity-of-effort and physical solutions like CENTRIX to facilitate coalition information sharing while providing information assurance and security protection required to maintain interagency cooperation. The combined force commander on the battlefield today, whether SOF or conventional, must negotiate these obstacle courses enroute to successful campaign prosecution.
The use of Special Operations Command and Control Elements, SOF liaison elements [SOFLE], [and] coalition force liaison elements maintains continuous connectivity throughout the AOR and are essential to our continued success.
Q: Your area of responsibility encompasses not only the two major conflict countries of Afghanistan and Iraq but a number of other countries in southwest Asia and eastern Africa. How have you organized your command to deal with the vast differences among those responsibilities?
A: We have organized by sub-regions, the Horn of Africa [HOA], the central Asian states and the Arabian Peninsula [AP]. Our subordinate headquarters are appropriately focused on these regions; SOCCE-HOA is primarily focused on regional persistent engagement through theater security cooperation. CJSOTF-A focuses primarily on Afghanistan but also has four ODAs and one ODB who work regional activities and have been employed last year in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. Finally, CJSOTF-AP is focused on Iraq currently but also works with Jordanian SOF to assist in building the ISOF Brigade for the Iraqi Army. The SOCCENT/CFSOCC staff has added SOCCE-IZ, SOCCE-A to our organizational structure and is integrated into multiple joint interagency task forces and a HOA working group which focus the efforts against Al Qaeda and associated movements [AQAM] in the CENTCOM AOR. Further, SOCCENT/CFSOCC continues to maintain HQs in Tampa and Qatar that are co-located with CENTCOM’s main and forward headquarters.
Q: How would you characterize the cooperation and partnerships with special forces of countries with your AOR? From a technology point of view, how compatible are you with those other forces in terms of performing joint missions?
A: The SOF forces in the AOR have a wide array of capabilities across the spectrum of MOD, MOI and MOS forces. The most mature capabilities often do not reside in the Ministry of Defense forces. Conscript armies with 1- to 2-year periods of service in some nations inhibit the ability to develop and sustain real capability. Since the threat to government stability is found often within their own borders, forces from the Ministry of Interior, intelligence services and Ministry of Security often are the most mature and capable to effectively find, fix and finish the terrorist threat in their countries.
That said, we work closely with the MOD counter-terrorist [CT] forces and SOF in many countries in the AOR. Some we partner with quietly and some in a more open manner. SOF forces from Jordan, Iraq, UAE and Bahrain have had direct involvement in OEF and OIF. The Iraqi ISOF Brigade is an excellent combat force which was created under the supervision of U.S. SOF and also assisted with initial entry training by our Jordanian partners. This is an excellent relationship, and it highlights the initiative between Jordan and the U.S. to create a SOF regional training center in Jordan, known as the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center [KASOTC], which will break ground for a new facility in the spring of 2006.
Our partners in the region all recognize the AQAM threat and are working with us and other allies to enhance the capability of their SOF forces. This will require a change in our approach to theater security cooperation programs [TSCP]; episodic, shortterm joint combined exercise training and legacy exercises do not have the persistent contact required to build capability. It will also require us to focus on specific units to ensure they are interoperable, sustainable and have personnel assignment policies that keep soldiers in the same units. We also need to look at our IMET [International Military Education and Training] programs to ensure that those foreign SOF officers we send to school actually return to the units and leadership positions that will enhance their CT and SOF capability. This concept may also require us to look at MOI and MOS forces as the target of our efforts if MOD policies don’t support real growth potential. We will work with our GCC HQ and each embassy country team to focus on this mission. Future success depends on our regional partners’ ability to fight AQAM with their own resources and our assistance.
Q: What role does your command have in training up the Iraqi Special Forces units? Are there similar efforts ongoing for the Afghanistan National Army? What tools are they [Iraqi SOF] most in need of to take their capabilities to the next level?
A: CJSOTF-AP is heavily engaged in the development of Iraqi special operations forces operating under the MOD, while other U.S. and coalition forces develop MOI CT forces. CJSOTF-A has not yet been tasked to develop a special operations force in Afghanistan. One of the SOF truths is: “special operations forces cannot be mass produced” while not profound, it is clearly a universal truism. The intense screening, training and evaluation period that is required to produce a SOF-capable individual within the peaceful confines of the continental United States is both demanding and timeconsuming. Developing units that are capable of conducting SOF missions even under ideal conditions is extremely challenging.
Achieving a similar level of capability in a war zone crosses the line from challenging to outright tough, but our allies and young SOF personnel have been doing that exceptionally well. In Iraq, CJSOTF-AP has been highly successful in the development of the ISOF Brigade that has a CT element, a commando element, a support battalion and a training battalion to train its own forces. The brigade will be at full operating strength by the summer of 2006 but has already proven to be a highly effective force on the battlefield. The ISOF force needs state-of-theart medical equipment, communications, night vision, weapon optics, weapons and mobility platforms to continue its growth.
CJSOTF-AP effectively partners with ISOF forces enabling them with communications, medical and fire support capabilities not yet resident in the IA or the ISOF brigade. The CT element is well-equipped with U.S.-made weapons and equipment making it among the most capable CT forces in the AOR.
As the Iraqi Army and the Afghan National Security Forces mature, the ability to better support or develop their SOF capabilities will improve. Fielding modern equipment to these welltrained forces is the next step. And finally, solving the more costly challenge of mobility platforms will give their national SOF capabilities tactical and operational reach.
Q: In general, is the acquisition system in place to react to urgent equipment needs adequate and agile enough to meet the current operational environment?
A: The SOF acquisition system through SOCOM has proven agile and responsive. The ability to procure off-the-shelf technologies and adapt them along with accelerating ongoing acquisition and fielding programs has been responsive. Costly items such as airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] platforms and SOF-specific helicopters are more difficult requirements to fill. SOCOM has programmed enough to meet our projected needs, but we currently are short key ISR platforms. SOF shares the same shortfall as our conventional forces in counter- IED programs; this is not an acquisition and fielding problem but a research and development challenge, which requires national focus. IEDs are the terrorist’s precision-guided weapon and all efforts of our technology industries need to focus on this challenge.
Q: In general, what types of communications systems will enhance the efficiency and capabilities of your warrior?
A: Communication is the thread that weaves together our operational capability; our first priority in a joint and combined environment is interoperability. Interoperability must occur not just between services in our DoD but among our allies, as well as among manufacturers and generations of like systems. The second priority in communications is the ability to operate with access and transparency across security protocols within an individual clearance and need to know. Access and relative transparency in databasing is a must for agility in man-hunting and networkcentric organizational warfare. The operator on the ground needs the systems to not only communicate but to immediately know where to go next, based on interrogation and exploitation at target sites. Waiting for a cumbersome bureaucracy to respond to immediate intelligence queries is an unacceptable obstacle to battlefield agility giving our foe the advantage. The third priority is clearly downsized multifunctional devices and batteries. As a leader, I need more robust and reliable network access in portable devices; I need to C2 from any location. While the technology exists it is not optimum nor is it reliable or fast.
There is a growing requirement for encryption/decryption for all communication devices, particularly for accessing computers. Password protection is increasingly more important and should enable greater transparency and sharing based on identity/classification coding of passwords. The technology is available but integrating it and ensuring information assurance are prohibiting rapid exploitation of these technologies.
Again, secure interoperability and transparency in C4I systems followed by the downsizing of multifunctional devices with similarly downsized but powerful batteries remains a tactical priority.
Q: Besides fighting the war on terror with weapons, the war is well served by the men and women with PSYOP and civil affairs units. Can you describe the advantages and benefits that these forces add to your mission?
A: Our psychological operations and civil affairs forces are powerful combat multipliers. Often erroneously paired together; these are two separate and distinct capabilities. The fact that these are low-density capabilities in the active force structure and that mobilization challenges in the reserve component impact on their availability limits to some degree the continuity of their operations. PSYOPS support elements, tactical PSYOP teams, military information support teams and psychological operations task forces are ubiquitous on both the Afghan and Iraqi battlefields.
These elements promulgate multimedia products including comic books, newspapers, magazines, handbills, leaflets and electronic messages over ground and satellite radio and television, both commercial and military. PSYOP helps U.S. and coalition forces influence populations to deny support for extremists and increase support to friendly governments and coalition forces. PSYOP provides commanders nonlethal effects on the battlefield to help them achieve their objectives. They provide support from disseminating products such as comics with election support themes, to broadcasting programs that support hotlines and other information gathering.
PSYOP messages resonate best with the target audiences and are most effective because they are based on the truth. PSYOP is intended to “influence” a targeted audience; but so are the New York Times and Washington Post. PSYOP audiences are foreign, both foe and friend alike. We really need to debunk this myth that PSYOP is a distorted view of the facts, it is merely a message in multimedia intended to influence an audience, or in other words present an alternate point of view to that expressed by our enemies and their supporters. Electronic media messages target the majority of any international audiences, the greatest medium being satellite television and radios. This change in message distribution media from localized line-of-sight radio and print to regional and worldwide audiences presents challenges to outdated ideas on message content control and delivery.
We can no longer control bleedover of physical borders to include computer media access. This confuses the issues surrounding who the target audience is; there is no longer a boundary between foreign, allied and U.S. and computer communications in the satellite age. Unfortunately, our legacy approvals process and the mischaracterization of the purpose of PSYOP messages impede our ability to deliver focused messages regionally and globally. Again, technology has the power to greatly enhance our message; yet culture, bureaucracy and legacy approval processes often prevent more than local success.
On the other hand, our civil affairs forces have no real challenges to their employment; they remain one of the most capable and sought-after enablers both in the combat zones and on their periphery. Professional civil affairs forces are culturally astute, long-term specialists who often work their skill set in their civilian profession. This is why the overwhelming majority of CA forces reside in the reserve component. For the SOF or conventional commander, they can be the carrot that supports the stick, the enabler that gains local access, the assessor that provides focused priorities and an information conduit with their relationships to local and regional leaders and professionals. CA capabilities are required before, during and after major combat, and their capabilities can be enhanced by habitual dedicated relationships with the SOF and conventional units to which they will be assigned.
This habitual association will ensure CA forces are tied to their battlespace owner’s campaigns from inception to conclusion and will ensure the trust required to be successful is developed over a career of interaction.
I cannot say enough about the power of CA except there are not enough present with resident skills being applied correctly; mobilization management and misapplication of their structure against other priorities have hindered even greater success.
Q: With the numerical increasing size of U.S. special operations forces in general, have you started to see any benefits in the number of people you have at your disposal for operational missions? Has there been any sharing or handing over of some missions that your forces have been doing to regular forces to free up your people for more SOF-specific duties?
A: The initial increases in manpower in SOF have helped the SOCs through increased staff capability. We at the staff level still rely heavily on joint manning documents for CFSOCC and our CJSOTFs, as our peacetime MTOEs and JTDs are not robust enough for wartime manning of three theaters of war within CENTCOM.
Specialized requirements to man LNOs, CLEs, SOFLEs, JIATFs, SOCCEs and other ad-hoc structures to facilitate combined arms, joint coalition and interagency warfare continue to require the cannibalization of units and HQs to provide the required C2/C4I architecture to fight the current fight.
The programs and plans to increase high-demand, low-density capabilities like SOF rotary wing aviation, civil affairs, PSYOP, C4I units, ISR as well as Special Forces will help in time. Today, we play the cards we have in the priorities the senior warfighter’s layout and, I might add our leaders do that very well, supporting each other’s needs and sharing assets while complementing each other’s capabilities. We have not passed any SOF mission to our conventional force counterparts; however, we have become more complementary as every segment of our military learns to leverage the combat experience of our young service members. We both execute direct action missions; we both train and operate with coalition and indigenous forces to include combined and integrated operations. We in SOF call this FID and our conventional and coalition partners call it military assistance, partnering or military training. Both General Casey in Iraq and Lieutenant General Eikenberry in Afghanistan have defined our primary mission as FID, but due to our cultural expertise and awareness as well as our historical experience operating with indigenous forces and armies, we have also been asked to mentor our own conventional forces in this regard. In Iraq, SOF forces developed a POI for the counter-insurgency academy training incoming company and battalion leaders on COIN, and effective TTPs in training and operating with indigenous forces.
In HOA, we partner with conventional forces who conduct MTTs through our SOFLE program. Our SOFLEs in key HOA countries will take conventional MTTs and other forces and integrate them into our longer-term training with partner nation SOF elements. While ideally we would use our ODAs, ODBs and SEAL platoons for that purpose; those high-demand forces are less available with the current tempo in the combat zones. Our effort to build capacity in our partner nation’s SOF forces requires innovative approaches in our current resource-challenged environments.
In sum, there remain more tasks than there are resources; current and projected growth, especially in air frames and ISR, will have a great impact.
Never before has there been better integration, partnering and complementary activities among conventional coalition forces and SOF. The current combined-force commanders in our AOR leverage our strength to enhance their operations as well as political goals and objectives.
Q: Is there anything else you would like add?
A: Thanks for the opportunity to share my thoughts. ♦