USSOCOM Manning and Training Needs
SEVERAL HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES MUST BE ADDRESSED TO MEET USSOCOM’S EXPANDED ROLE. THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE HAS RECENTLY ISSUED A REPORT ON ITS FINDING REGARDING USSOCOM’S MANNING CAPABILITIES AND ITS TRAINING GOALS. SOTECH OFFERS A SUMMARY OF THEIR FINDINGS HERE.
Although DoD plans to significantly increase the number of special operations forces personnel, USSOCOM has not yet fully determined all of the personnel requirements needed to meet its expanded mission. While it has determined the number of personnel needed to increase its number of warfighter units, it has not completed analyses to determine how many headquarters staff are needed to train and equip these additional warfighters or how many headquarters staff are needed to plan and synchronize global actions against terrorist networks—a new mission for the command. DoD plans to begin increasing the number of headquarters positions and has requested funds for these positions in its fiscal year 2007 budget request. Until these analyses are completed, USSOCOM cannot provide assurances to the secretary of defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the command’s headquarters will meet, exceed or fall short of the requirements needed to address the command’s expanded mission.
The military services and USSOCOM have made progress since fiscal year 2000 in recruiting, training and retaining special operations forces personnel, but they must overcome persistently low personnel inventory levels and insufficient numbers of newly trained personnel, in certain specialties, to meet DoD’s plan to increase the number of special operations forces. In addition, GAO’s review of the service components’ annual reports required by USSOCOM shows that the reports have not provided the information needed to determine whether they have enough personnel to meet current and future requirements. Without such information, the command will be unable to determine whether the service components’ human capital management approaches, including recruiting, training and retention strategies, will be effective in meeting the planned growth targets.
Since fiscal year 2000, the number of special operations forces personnel deployed for operations has greatly increased, and the number deployed for training has simultaneously decreased. USSOCOM has taken action to manage the challenge of increased deployments; in August 2005, it began requiring active duty personnel to remain at least an equal amount of time at home as deployed. But the command’s service components have not consistently or fully implemented this policy. This is because the policy lacks clear guidance on the length of time that the components must ensure that personnel remain within the deployment policy guidelines. In addition, officials with the command’s Army and Navy service components expressed concerns regarding the reliability of their information required to track the deployments of their personnel. Without consistent and reliable data, USSOCOM does not have the information it needs to effectively manage the personnel deployments of special operations forces, which affects its ability to maintain the readiness, retention, and training of these personnel.
EXPANDED ROLE
Over the past three years, DoD has expanded the role of USSOCOM to include responsibility for planning and leading the department’s efforts in the global war on terrorism. In addition to training, organizing, equipping and deploying combat-ready special operations forces to the geographic combatant commanders, the command has the mission to lead, plan, synchronize and, as directed, execute global operations against terrorist networks.
The specific responsibilities assigned to USSOCOM include:
• Integrating DoD strategy, plans, intelligence priorities and operations against terrorist networks designated by the secretary of defense;
• Planning campaigns against designated terrorist networks;
• Prioritizing and synchronizing theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against designated terrorist networks in coordination with the geographic combatant commanders;
• Exercising command and control of operations in support of selected campaigns, as directed; and
• Providing military representation to U.S. national and international agencies for matters related to United States and multinational campaigns against designated terrorist networks, as directed by the secretary of defense.
In addition, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism establishes the approach DoD will take in fulfilling its role within the larger national strategy for combating terrorism. The strategy provides guidance on the department’s military objectives and their relative priority in the allocation of resources. In addition, this strategy implements the designation of USSOCOM as the supported combatant command for planning, synchronizing and, as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks.
USSOCOM has received considerable increases in funding to meet its expanded responsibilities in the global war on terrorism. Specifically, funding for the command has increased from more than $3.8 billion in fiscal year 2001 to more than $6.4 billion in fiscal year 2005. In addition, the command received more than $5 billion in supplemental funds from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2005. During this time, funding for military personnel costs for USSOCOM increased by more than $800 million, representing a 53 percent increase. DoD plans further increases in funding for the command. The president’s fiscal year 2007 budget request for USSOCOM is $8 billion, and the department plans additional increases for the command through fiscal year 2011.
HOW MANY?
USSOCOM determines personnel requirements for its headquarters by conducting formal personnel studies. These studies are directed and approved by USSOCOM’s leadership. The study teams conduct a variety of analyses to determine personnel requirements and interview individuals within the reviewed organization to determine the tasks they perform and the level of effort necessary to fulfill the workload requirements. The studies are used to validate the personnel requirements and support data-based decisions for allocating additional resources during USSOCOM planning, programming and budgeting processes. The command is currently conducting studies to determine the number of military and civilian personnel who are needed at its headquarters to meet the command’s expanded responsibilities.
Although these studies were in progress at the time of the GAO, DoD has already made the decision to increase the number of military and civilian positions for the command’s headquarters, beginning with its fiscal year 2007 budget request. According to currently approved plans, DoD will increase the number of military and civilian positions for USSOCOM headquarters by more than 75 percent between fiscal years 2007 and 2011. These increases include more than 700 additional positions for the command’s Center for Special Operations, which combines the intelligence, operations and planning functions at the headquarters to plan and direct the global war on terrorism. However, given the fact that the command’s internal analyses of personnel requirements were ongoing at the time of the GAO review, the intended increase is not based on a comprehensive analysis of personnel requirements.
The GAO’s prior work has shown that strategic workforce planning addresses two critical needs for an organization. First, strategic workforce planning aligns an organization’s human capital program with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals. Second, such planning develops long-term strategies for acquiring, developing and retaining the staff needed to achieve programmatic goals. A key principle in strategic workforce planning calls for determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future programmatic results. However, until USSOCOM fully completes its analyses of the personnel requirements needed to carry out its Title 10 responsibilities and its expanded mission, it cannot provide assurances to the secretary of defense and the Congress that currently planned growth in the number of personnel for the command’s headquarters will meet, exceed or fall short of the requirements needed to address the command’s expanded mission.
DEPLOYMENTS
In line with established policy directives, USSOCOM gathers deployment information on a weekly basis from the service components and the geographic combatant commands. These reports include information on the number of special operations forces personnel and special operations forces units that are deployed around the world. In addition, the components report the type of the deployment, such as deployments for operations or for training. From these weekly updates, USSOCOM develops a comprehensive deployed forces report, which is presented to the USSOCOM commander and included in updates for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The GAO’s review of USSOCOM data showed that since fiscal year 2000, deployments of special operations forces personnel have substantially increased. Specifically, the average weekly number of deployed special operations forces personnel was 64 percent, or about 3,100 personnel, greater in fiscal year 2005 than in fiscal year 2000.
GAO analysis also showed that the vast majority of recent deployments outside of the United States were to the Central Command area of responsibility, which accounted for 85 percent of deployed special operations forces in fiscal year 2005. Significantly, more than 99 percent of these deployments supported ongoing combat operations. In contrast, in fiscal year 2000, only 20 percent of special operations forces deployments were to the Central Command. The percentage of special operations forces personnel deployed to the European Command, the Pacific Command and the Southern Command decreased between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2005.
TRAINING
While special operations forces have experienced a substantial increase in deployments for operations, there has been a simultaneous decrease in deployments for training. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of special operations forces personnel deployed for operations increased, while the percentage of personnel deployed for training decreased.
The decrease in deployments for training appears to have had at least two effects. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, for example, the amount of time for which special operations forces deployed for training to maintain proficiency in battle skills decreased by 50 percent. Officials with the Army, Navy and Air Force service components told the GAO that since many of their units have been deployed to the Central Command area of responsibility, they have had fewer opportunities to conduct proficiency training for all mission tasks. As a result, special operations forces units are focusing their training on the tasks that are required for operations in the Central Command and are assuming some risk by not training for other mission tasks. For example, officials with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command told GAO that specialized training such as military free fall and underwater combat operations have been reduced to a minimum, since these skills are not required to support ongoing operations.
Although the GAO analysis showed that special operations forces deployed less frequently for skills proficiency training from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, they were told that the amount of training that special operations forces accomplished may not have been greatly affected. In particular, they were told that Army special operations forces units do not necessarily have to deploy in order to accomplish training that can be done at their home station. In addition, the fact that many special operations forces units are deploying for combat operations results in ample opportunities to maintain proficiency in essential skills. Officials with the U.S. Army Special Operations Command explained that special operations forces no longer train to fight because they are training as they fight.
Air Force Special Operations Command stated that increased deployments for operations had affected the ability of its air crews and special tactics squadrons to achieve all required mission-essential training. However, officials stated that this has not degraded overall readiness, because not all of these training tasks are currently being performed in the Central Command. In addition, officials stated that if mission priorities were to shift away from the Central Command and different missions needed to be performed, not all of its special operations forces personnel would be required to have achieved those training tasks in order for a mission to be successfully carried out. However, not all special operations forces can accomplish training tasks at their home station. According to naval special warfare Command officials, naval special warfare units do not have adequate home station training ranges and are required to deploy in order achieve most training tasks. Yet, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, the amount of time that naval special warfare personnel deployed for skills proficiency training decreased by more than 30 percent.
Special operations forces have also deployed less frequently to train with foreign military forces overseas. As we have previously reported, this type of training is important because it enables special operations forces to practice mission skills such as providing military instruction in a foreign language and maintaining language proficiency and familiarity with local geography and cultures, which are essential in the foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions.
BOTTOM LINE
The military services and USSOCOM have faced human capital challenges in recruiting, training and retaining a sufficient number of forces, and many of these challenges continue. In large part, these challenges are attributable to the rigorous selection and training processes set for these personnel. Nonetheless, the GAO believes the command would be better able to address these challenges if it had a clearer understanding of the progress its service components have made in achieving planned growth, which is clearly linked with appropriate goals and measures. Furthermore, the command is attempting to meet its growth goals at a time of heightened personnel deployments. However, according to the GAO, the command is managing these deployments without reliable data. Such information would further enable the command to meet the full range of its missions while maintaining the readiness, retention and training of its personnel.
The GAO recommended three actions be taken. Those recommendations follow as well as the DoD response.
1. Establish specific milestones for completing the command’s ongoing analyses of personnel requirements and, once completed, make any needed adjustments to the current plans for personnel increases for the command’s headquarters and related future funding requests.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. USSOCOM is conducting an extensive analysis of headquarters and component command manpower. The results will inform the command’s Strategic Planning Process which determines the warfighting capabilities and capacities required by USSOCOM to accomplish its warfighting mission. The manpower requirement for headquarters manning is being determined by extensive, ongoing manpower study scheduled for completion in March 2007. DoD will monitor the progress and validate the results of this study.
2. Revise the command’s directive for its program to monitor the status of special operations forces to include performance objectives, goals and measures of progress for achieving planned growth; and enforce all of the directive’s reporting requirements.
DoD Response: Concur. USSOCOM is updating its directive “Monitorship Program Policy and Procedures” dated 24 April 1995. Further, the department and USSOCOM is continuously developing and implementing new tools and metrics to more accurately measure the actual health of special operations forces. The challenge remains that each component reports data using the metrics of its parent service. As a result, there is difficulty in comparing such things as retention and retention incentive eligibility between components when each service determines these factors in a different manner. To have each component format their service-derived data in a common database is highly desired.
3. Clarify the methodology that the command’s service components should use for enforcing the deployment policy, and take steps to ensure that the service components have tracking systems in place that utilize reliable data to meet the requirements of the policy.
DoD Response: Partially Concur. USSOCOM leadership and all service component commanders implemented the USSOCOM Red Line Deployment Policy in July 2005. This policy is in compliance with DoD’s deployment rules as stated in the under secretary of defense, personnel and readiness memorandum dated 30 July 2004, “Force Deployment Rules for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.” DoD policy states, “Dwell time: 1:1 ration of deployed time (in support of any contingency operation) to home station time. Whenever possible, forces are chosen based upon longest dwell time.” The challenge remains that each service uses different metrics for calculating deployment time, making it difficult for USSOCOM, or any joint headquarters, to compare one service against another. The department will work toward developing a multi-service data base system and metrics that will rectify and standardize deployment and other readiness metrics across the joint community. ♦