Q&A: Major General David P. Fridovich

Pacific Warrior
Building Capacity and Partnerships Throughout the Region



Major General David P. Fridovich
Commanding General
Special Operations Command, Pacific

Major General David P. Fridovich was commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in 1976. He graduated from Knox College, where he received a bachelor of arts degree in international relations and he later received a master’s degree in political science from Tulane.

He has served in a variety of operational and command assignments. The majority of his career has been spent in the Pacific Rim region.

After his commissioning and initial entry training at Fort Benning, Ga., Infantry Officer’s School, Fridovich was assigned to the 1/60th Infantry Battalion, 172nd Light Infantry Brigade where he served as infantry and reconnaissance platoon leader, company executive officer, and light infantry company commander at Fort Richardson, Alaska.

In 1981, he returned to Fort Benning, where he completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. Fridovich was assigned as an assistant professor of military science, Norwich University, where he assumed the responsibilities of training the mountain cold weather cadre and rescue team. In 1984, he completed the Special Forces Detachment Officer's Qualification course and reported to the reactivated 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Lewis, Wash. While assigned to the 3rd Battalion, he commanded both SF operational detachment alphas and operational detachment bravo and was the battalion operations officer.

From 1989 to 1991, Fridovich completed his first joint assignment as a JCS exercise planner in the Republic of Korea at the Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea (CJ3). His second joint assignment was in a similar position from 1993 to 1995, as chief, JCS exercises at Special Operations Command, Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii. Between these two assignments he was the senior Special Forces observer controller, and later chief, Special Operations Division at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Little Rock Air Base and Fort Polk, La. In 1995, he assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Special Operations Task Forces-Haiti, where his command was involved with Operation Uphold Democracy, in support of the United Nations Mission in Haiti. The remainder of his battalion command tour involved planning and executing Special Forces operations in the Caribbean basin.

In June 1997, Fridovich was assigned as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations (ADCSOPS), U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C., and later became the DCSOPS through November 1998. Prior to assuming command of the 1st SFG(A), He commanded the Combined/Joint Special Operations Task Force- Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina from January through July 2000.

Fridovich assumed command of the 1st SFG(A) in August 2000. During his time in command, the 1st SFG(A) conducted numerous operational deployments throughout the Pacific region. Since January 2002, He commanded Army Special Operations Task Force, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, Zamboanga, Republic of the Philippines through 25 June 2002. He then returned to Camp Smith as deputy director for operations at U.S. Pacific Command, before assuming his present position as commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific.

Fridovich is a fully qualified Joint, Army and Special Forces officer. His military education includes the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and Joint Professional Military Education all phases. In 1999, he completed the British Forces’ Royal College of Defence Studies of Seaford House, London, England. Fridovich has numerous joint and army awards and decorations.

Interviewed by Jeff McKaughan, SOTECH Editor

Q: Can you start by giving me an overview of the SOCPAC mission?

A: As a subordinate unified command of U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM], SOCPAC and its component units deploy throughout the Pacific in support of USPACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Program, deliberate plans and contingencies. SOCPAC elements regularly conduct small unit exchanges, joint and combined training events, and operational deployments throughout the Pacific, fostering interoperability with host nation and interagency partners.

The command also maintains a crisis response capability to function as a rapidly deployable joint task force [JTF]. Today, SOCPAC forces are operating throughout the Pacific Theater in close concert with U.S. embassies to increase partner nation capabilities to defeat terrorism and insurgencies, and address underlying conditions that support terrorism.

Q: How would you sum up your command philosophy?

A: I have more of a command practice than a command philosophy. SOF are mature professionals with regional experience and operational acumen. I leverage their knowledge and expertise, and empower people to continue to learn and develop as they execute critical missions in austere and dynamic environments.

One of the first things I did when I assumed command here two years ago was [to] produce a strategic estimate. It gave us a design of where we wanted to focus and apply special operations forces unique capabilities to the war on terrorism, partner nation engagements and other programs.

An experienced force is the most important means we have to implement our strategy. In order to maximize SOF skills and experience, commanders must provide a clear vision and intent, and know their units’ strengths and weaknesses. Balancing capability and enthusiasm means being able to do the things you say you are going to do.

Another aspect of my philosophy is that I do not put a timeline on success. Instead, I emphasize conditions and criteria of success with my staff and components. It is important for leaders to establish priorities, provide resources and apply an effects-based approach to see how we are doing. We have to evaluate if we are in the right places achieving the right results that we were asked to achieve.

At the end of the day, I depend on a mature and experienced force, relationships based on trust and confidence, and an effects-based approach to discover and sustain what works best while conducting special operations missions.

Q: What is the role of SOF in the war on terrorism?

A: In order to address the underlying conditions that foster terrorism, SOCPAC works with its host nation partners in order to help provide security and stability. This attracts economic development and shapes conditions for good governance and rule of law.

Much of SOCPAC’s activities consist of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare. SOF’s primary contribution in this interagency activity is to organize, train and assist host nation security forces. The indirect approach relies heavily on SOF’s organic capability to build host nation defense capacity, provide civil affairs assets to assist in humanitarian and civic assistance, and offer information operations resources to aid the host nation in countering violent ideological threats.

By working closely with our host nation and U.S. embassy partners, we actively promote peace and prosperity and offer options other than violence and despair to the citizens in the region.

Q: What are the biggest benefits to the close cooperation that you have with other special operations forces in the Pacific region?

A: SOCPAC enjoys a significant amount of regional experience and constructive relationships with other nations’ SOF. Frequent deployments, exercises and exchanges allow our personnel to immerse themselves in the region, build a socio-cultural knowledge base and sustain relationships over an extended period of time.

Close cooperation has also given us the opportunity to support our partners in building a long lasting, self-sustaining capability to provide security, develop good governance, attract foreign direct investment and counter violent ideology. This approach is a slow process, and when done correctly, achieves lasting results.

Part of our commitment is to remain patient and focus on a longterm indirect approach that results in self-sustaining host nation partners.

Q: What is the main thrust of the JSOTF-P efforts in the Philippines?

A: SOCPAC’s continued contribution to our counterparts in the Philippines is a demonstrable example of a successful interagency, multinational indirect approach to combating terrorism. The JSOTFP mission is to advise and assist our counterparts in the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] in counterterrorism activities. Our intent is to help our AFP counterparts become an increasingly professional and proficient security force dedicated to supporting civil authority and human rights, and capable of defeating terrorist and insurgent threats.

Additionally, over the past several years, JSOTF-P forces have worked with our AFP counterparts on hundreds of humanitarian projects throughout the southern Philippines. From medical civic action programs to engineering projects, such as building roads and schools and digging wells, the AFP and U.S. forces have done much to address the basic needs for the people of the southern Philippines.

Combining defense capacity building and taking care of local populace concerns is a mutually enhancing endeavor. The broader populations who support terrorist and insurgent groups are often economically and educationally deprived people. The terrorist groups use this deprivation in a quid pro quo way; e.g., they give a child an education and radical indoctrination. Finding a way to get there first and give people a leg up without creating resentment and before the terrorists or insurgents can influence them is an important aspect of the JSOTF-P’s mission.

Q: How do you measure success with JSOTF-P operations?

A: After two years on Basilan Island, for example, the environment no longer fostered terrorist activities and the Abu Sayyaf Group [ASG] left the island. The AFP effectively drained the swamp of underlying conditions with our assistance. The Basilan people now live in a safe and secure environment.

As a result, the AFP downsized their presence from 15 infantry battalions down to two battalions on Basilan Island. By guaranteeing security, the AFP made it safe for teachers and doctors to return to Basilan. Private business and non-governmental organizations also operate in an area they once shunned. The AFP won back the support of the local population and the Philippine government, producing a long-lasting effect.

Another indicator of success came from the islanders themselves. The Basilan people chose to support government and not the ASG. The local populace saw value in supporting the government because the AFP was more powerful and legitimate than the terrorists. The AFP provided the local populace with a stable security environment that enabled commerce and significant quality of life improvements.

Q: How important are information operations and civil affairs to the operational success in the Pacific Rim?

A: The military aspects of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are only a part of our approach to threats in the region. Economic and informational instruments of power are also critical. U.S. and partner tactical successes in the war on terrorism will not mean very much if we lose the competition for hearts and minds.

In a counter terrorism [CT] or counterinsurgency [COIN] campaign, we, along with our partner nations and other U.S. government agencies, do not only have to battle elusive foes, we also have to support infrastructure development, engage constructively with the local populace, non-governmental organizations and the media. COIN is a separate and distinct form of warfare; it is a competition between ideologies and distinct socio-political movements.

Successful COIN operations focus on diffusing violent sociopolitical movements, which is best done across a full spectrum of communication and thoughtful action that encompasses programs across many agencies and non-governmental entities. To be successful means being able to communicate in an open and transparent manner with local populaces and community leaders in order to understand their needs and then take appropriate action to address those grievances. This also helps build trust and legitimacy of the local government. Ignoring or dismissing local attitudes and perceptions leads to failure.

Terrorist and insurgent groups use media, rumor and word-ofmouth information campaigns to instill fear, discredit legitimate governments, and gain political momentum. We have to support our partners to offer a compelling alternative narrative and counter propaganda, especially in light of terrorist use of the Internet, global connectivity and 24/7 media.

By combining effective information campaigns and addressing local grievances, we help promote legitimate governments and counter the messages terrorists are advocating. If we want to continue to diffuse terrorist and insurgent organizations, we need to work together to offer alternative ideologies, economic opportunity, safety, different channels for political influence to travel and ways to strengthen family and cultural ties outside of terrorist movements.

Q: What are your current and future plans to increase the partnering capability between countries in SEA and U.S. SOF in combined operations?

A: We closely plan and coordinate our activities with our partner nations and U.S. embassies to ensure we are working with the right partners in the right areas at the right time.

Strategically, due to the transnational nature of terrorist and insurgent organizations, the Archipelago of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia is a key region where we presently focus our indirect efforts. We base our approach on the needs of the legitimate government’s security forces and the unique socio-economic and geographic characteristics of the region.

Once stability and good governance is created in the outer islands, then non-governmental organizations and private organizations will be more likely to operate there because they realize the areas are safer. Business and investments will also most likely expand in these regions due to a more stable environment.

Five to 10 years from now we will be working with new partner nations and sustaining the relationships we have built over time. We have anchored relationships in the Philippines and Thailand, and will continue growing our partnerships in Malaysia and Indonesia.

We will most likely broaden our indirect approach efforts to include working by, through, and with forces in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India. Our approach will continue to develop new, trusting relationships with the host nation partners as lead. We will ensure we can meet their expectations before we commit to supporting them. We will engage these nations in a purposeful manner to make sure we can build successful relations just as we have in Southeast Asia.

As we build partnerships with new countries, we look forward to establishing strong links to the respective U.S. embassies and Asian multilateral security organizations as needed and where appropriate. With a clear understanding of values and concerns of stakeholders, we will be able to provide more appropriate alternatives to political violence. This requires leveraging the knowledge and capabilities of U.S. and partner nation diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, military and law enforcement instruments of power in a coordinated and focused effort.

Q: For many years, SOCPAC has been holding the annual Pacific Area Special Operations Conference [PASOC]. Why has this become such an institution and what are the real benefits for all of the participants?

A: PASOC brings together SOF leaders from over 18 countries with academics, think tanks, NGOs, CT experts and policymakers. We meet to develop a shared understanding of the security environment and the underlying conditions of violence, to build relationships, and coordinate innovative action to counter terrorism and insurgency in Asia.

From our discussions, we learn to appreciate how security and stability create safe conditions so that economic development, rule of law, and education can flourish and provide alternatives to violence and despair.

PASOC also provides a robust exchange of actionable recommendations that promote measurable results needed to be relevant in an increasingly complex environment. We all have important roles and contributions to make. No nation is so large that it can go it alone; no nation is so small that cannot make a strategic impact and contribute in a meaningful way.

PASOC provides an important venue for dialogue, shared purposes, and multinational cooperation that is absolutely critical to our mutual success in combating terrorism and insurgency in Asia.

Q: From your perspective, are there tools or technologies that would, in general, benefit the SOF warrior whether in the Pacific area or any place else?

A: Having a standard system to measure and monitor training outputs and capacity building that come from our engagement with partner nations would be very useful.

The second tool that would assist us would be technology to help a JTF make rapid decisions and employ decentralized and flat organizations in concert with interagency partners. Remote units on the ground, in the air, and at sea often need direct links with their higher headquarters that are in different locations. Improved bandwidth and means for rapid data transmission that can expedite the decisionmaking cycle and integrate stakeholders are important.

Finally, producing virtual workspaces where diverse stakeholders and communities of interest can effectively share information and collaborate would also improve interagency and multi-national operations.

Q: With a large geographic area to cover, much of it separated by water, how are your people in a position to take advantage of distance learning and computer-aided systems to stay current on education and training needs?

A: The best approach is for our operational elements to travel with equipment that allows them to connect to home station and crosstrain while they are deployed. By leveraging technology, SOF in the field can reach back and complete training courses or take educational courses. What I would like to see happen in the future is teams having the ability to stay current on the latest training and lessons learned from different theaters by tapping into a repository of information instantly.

Given the challenges of time and distance that units face when they deploy, online distributive learning and knowledge management is vital to keeping SOF trained and educated.

Q: What assistance would you find useful from that would help bolster security and stability in the region?

A: We would welcome in-depth socio-economic and cultural analysis of some of the austere areas where we train with our partners, as well as focused research on underlying conditions that foster terrorism.

Before launching a CT or COIN initiative, SOF must understand what is happening on the ground from various perspectives, to include the local radicalization process. External approaches designed to improve local conditions in a COIN environment will fail if they do not include parallel and simultaneous engagement with how people perceive the world they inhabit.

SOF professionals must comprehensively understand the socioeconomic, historical, and cultural landscape in which social and political movements—to include terrorist groups—live. If we do not appreciate the complexity and richness of the values and concerns of the people with whom we are engaging, we will miss the mark.

Therefore, systematic polling, surveys, multi-disciplinary assessments, open source analysis, and focus group interviews would help us better understand the local radicalization process, as well as seeing more clearly what effects we are having in promoting security and addressing local grievances.

Q: What do you see as evolving missions for SOF? What will SOF look like in ten years?

A: Missions will adapt to the changes and needs within the emerging socio-economic and security environments. The mission profiles will not change as much as the locations where they will take place in the future, and under what circumstances. For example, I see us doing more with our up-and-coming partners in South Asia because it is an area of mutual interest and growth.

Language training and skill sets, then, will need to adjust based on geographic areas of interest. Our teams’ ability to culturally adapt and learn new languages will be critical for the future. Missions will also be influenced by technological advances. SOF will be employed in an increasingly decentralized manner, have less of a footprint, and will require innovative logistics and communications support.

Q: What do you see as SOF’s most significant success in the region during the past few years?

A: Terrorism has been disrupted in the region. This is a direct result of our partner nations’ efforts, our indirect approach, and the quality of relationships we have built over time in the region. We have focused on helping improve security conditions and address underlying conditions that foster terrorism in order to promote good governance and socio-economic growth.

Improving capacity building of security forces, facilitating constructive dialogue with local communities to help understand their concerns and provide for their needs, and working closely with the U.S. embassies and local authorities in the region are critical components to our efforts in the region. This success is not, however, centered on us.

The appropriate focus and credit belong to our partner nations. We are simply assisting and advising their successful efforts. If you look at Basilan Island in the Philippines, you can see how much the Armed Forces of the Philippines have accomplished. The local population was the center of gravity. The success was winning over the population. Since this was done well, others see that and want the same success in their areas. It encourages the local population to pride themselves on maintaining a secure environment and have faith in their local governments.

Q: What do you see as SOF’s toughest challenge in this theater?

A: We operate in an incredibly dynamic environment. The region enjoys a rich history of socio-economic, cultural, demographic, political and geographic diversity. The security challenges within the region also widely vary. What is appropriate in southeast Asia, for example, does not necessary apply to northeast Asia. Fortunately, due to our deployments and exercises, we have the opportunity to constantly learn from our partner nations and gain valuable insights on threats and opportunities.

Q: Looking back at your SOF experiences and military career, would you please share your most important lessons learned and best practices?

A: Assembling the right mix of SOF in a complex and ever-changing environment is one of my most important lessons learned. We produce synergy between the capabilities and variety of skills and experiences within SOF are employed properly and creatively. The timing of the deployment and flexibility of the main effort is also critical.

Depending on the circumstances and the phase of an operation, civil affairs, psychological operations, or special forces may be the main effort. When I was a forward operating base commander in Haiti in 1995, for example, there were times when civil military operations were the main effort. If the teams had challenges with security, there were special forces elements nearby. Because we had a variety of skills and abilities on hand, we could handle just almost anything, and help the Haitians move forward with better security and stability. These teams also had great perspectives on what was going on in their communities.

This brings up another importance lesson learned. SOF provide important insights on what is happening at the grassroots level, especially when they have gained the trust and respect of their counterparts and the local populace.

Another best practice is the use of comprehensive assessments that analyze local socio-economic conditions, security and stability, and the needs of the local populace. This provides a neutral way for various stakeholders to look at a complex situation and figure out how to best address the challenges at hand. These assessments also provide us indicators of our progress and help us to stay focused on long-term results. We knew when we met certain conditions we could modify the mission, re-allocate resources, redeploy, or move on to something else. We have taken these models and best practices that worked in Haiti and elsewhere, fine-tuned and adapted them, and have applied them successfully in Southeast Asia.

Q: Is there anything else you would like to add?

A: In the end, the only meaningful criteria for judging SOF’s strategy and operations in countering terrorism and insurgency in Asia are the effective and successful results and changes that ensue.

SOCPAC has established an effects-based assessment system that takes a close look at our return on investment regarding our relations with host nation partners. Based on the nation we are partnering with, we measure the effects on a quarterly basis.

The concept of our effects-based system is to assess how well we are doing with building strong relationships and improving capacity— not simply counting the number of activities. Our intent is to measure how effectively we assist host nation partners in winning over populations and developing institutions of stability. We are learning that we are making long-lasting progress, and that the results are not instant.

Therefore, we need to be patient. Just like the Cold War, which lasted over 50 years, we are dealing with a generational challenge when it comes to terrorism. Values and beliefs do not change overnight. Institutional capacity building, socio-economic development and education require long-term investments. We have to continue to work closely with our partners, build and sustain relations founded in trust, apply steady persistence to the problems at hand, and constantly assess and refine our actions along the way to peace and prosperity. ♦

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