USSOCOM Acquisition Under Review
THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) HAS BEEN TAKING A LOOK AT THE PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF USSOCOM ADMINISTERED PROGRAMS.
Established in 1987, USSOCOM is one of ten combatant commands directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense and in 2003 their role was to include leading the DoD’s GWOT operations.
Congress created USSOCOM to improve the ability of the United States to conduct special operations and as such vested the command with the responsibility and the authority for the development and acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute its own budget. To fund the acquisition of SOF-peculiar equipment, USSOCOM was given responsibility for supervising a separate Major Force Program-11 budget account. Congress determined that a dedicated funding mechanism was necessary because, in the past, the military departments had tended to give lower priority to SOF’s equipment needs than to their own needs. For fiscal year 2006, USSOCOM’s total budget was $7.2 billion, of which $1.9 billion was for development-and-acquisitionrelated purposes.
USSOCOM ACQUISITION
In acquiring SOF equipment, USSOCOM falls under the same DoD acquisition policies and guidelines and work force requirements that apply to the military departments and other defense agencies. The military departments and USSOCOM are governed by DoD’s 5000 Series for the Defense Acquisition System. Similarly, each military department, along with USSOCOM, has its own policies and procedures to implement higher level directives and guide the management of acquisition activities within the military departments or command.
USSOCOM’s acquisition work force training and tenure is governed by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA), enacted in 1990. The act specifically created a formal acquisition corps and defined educational, experience and tenure criteria needed for key positions, including program managers, contracting officers and other personnel involved in the acquisition process.
According to DoD, members of the acquisition corps may earn three progressive certification levels—basic (Level I), intermediate (Level II), and advanced (Level III). Each certification level is comprised of a combination of education, experience and training elements. Certification recognizes the level to which a member of the acquisition work force has achieved functional and core acquisition competencies required by a specific career field. Members of USSOCOM’s acquisition work force are required to meet the same training and certification requirements as those in the military departments.
USSOCOM’s approach to acquisition management also has some distinctive features. The command is unique in DoD in that it plans, funds, acquires and sustains weapon systems all under one roof. Specifically, all the key entities involved in the acquisition life cycle process—requirements developers, comptroller, contracting personnel, logistics planners, and program offices— are colocated. USSOCOM also uses a centralized approach to assess and prioritize requirements and select programs based on competing needs and available resources. USSOCOM’s customers— the SOF warriors—are directly involved in determining what weapon systems are pursued. In addition, USSOCOM can arrange to transfer program management and milestone decision authority responsibilities to one of the military departments to execute the program on behalf of USSOCOM. USSOCOM has done this with many of its programs that involve some modification of military department-provided equipment or in cases where the military departments may have greater technical and program management expertise.
USSOCOM has undertaken a diverse set of acquisition programs since January 2001 that are consistent with the command’s mission to address unique SOF needs and those needs for which there are no service-common requirement. USSOCOM has committed about $6 billion to date on these programs. The vast majority of USSOCOM’s acquisition programs are ACAT III level in size, have short acquisition cycles, and use modified commercial off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items or modify existing service equipment and assets.
In acquiring systems, USSOCOM has emphasized the need for 80 percent solutions that provide improved capabilities incrementally to the warfighter in reasonable time frames, rather than major development efforts that require advanced technologies and years of research and development. Both the ASDS and CV- 22 programs were started in the 1990s. Since 2001, USSOCOM has undertaken only one ACAT I level program. It was to develop a common avionics package for its fleet of transport, tanker and gunship aircraft. USSOCOM’s acquisition plans for the future—as reflected in its current Future Year Defense Program—continue to maintain its SOF-peculiar focus.
USSOCOM initiated 86 acquisition programs from 2001 to 2006 to meet SOF-peculiar requirements, which can be grouped into five major areas: rotary wing, fixed wing, maritime systems, information and intelligence systems, and special operations forces warrior equipment (e.g., vehicles and weapons).
Seventy-six of USSOCOM’s 86 acquisition programs are ACAT III level in size, and the majority of these programs use nondevelopmental and commercial off-the-shelf items to meet SOF-peculiar needs. A further breakdown of these programs indicates that most cost less than $25 million. The small number of larger, ACAT I (1) and II (6) level programs are fixed and rotary wing systems, costing $200 million or more. These larger programs involve modifications to existing platform systems and more substantial technology development efforts. There are three information and intelligence systems programs that are not categorized.
URGENT NEEDS
According to USSOCOM officials, urgent needs are not to be used as a means of circumventing or accelerating the normal program approval or funding processes. To that end, equipment acquired via the urgent needs process is fielded and sustained only for the duration of the military operation. The sponsoring component commander is responsible for determining postoperation disposition of any equipment acquired as a result of an urgent needs request.
USSOCOM has also fielded critical combat-related technologies through DoD’s advanced concept technology development (ACTD) program. DoD initiated the program in 1994 to help get new technologies that meet critical military needs into the hands of users faster and at less cost than the traditional acquisition process. Over the past five years, USSOCOM has fielded seven ACTD programs at a cost of about $385 million.
FUTURE
USSOCOM’s acquisition plan for the future—as reflected in its current Future Year Defense Program—continues to maintain a focus on providing SOF-peculiar equipment. The acquisition programs USSOCOM plans to start over the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 time frame are similar to the programs that USSOCOM is currently acquiring. There are 13 acquisition programs remaining in USSOCOM’s fiscal year 2007 to 2011 plan, and all are at the ACAT III level. These programs continue to be small scale, low cost, and will employ modified commercial-off-the-shelf and nondevelopmental items.
MIXED PERFORMANCE
Fifty-one (about 60 percent) of the 86 acquisition programs USSOCOM has undertaken since 2001 have progressed as planned, either staying within original cost and schedule estimates or experiencing cost increases unrelated to progress, such as for adding quantities to support ongoing combat operations . The other 35 (40 percent) of USSOCOM’s 86 programs have experienced or are likely to experience modest to, in a number of cases, significant cost increases and schedule delays due to a range of technical, programmatic or funding issues.
Although fewer in number, these programs make up about 50 percent of USSOCOM’s total funding for its acquisition programs. Ten of the programs have an estimated schedule slip of at least one year, and several programs were canceled because of a need to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered in developing the weapon system.
The programs that have not progressed as planned tend to be the larger, more complex platform-based programs USSOCOM is developing and programs where USSOCOM is dependent on the military departments for the basic platform or for equipment and/or other resources, such as program management support. Programs that are smaller, with less development risk, have better results.
In terms of the number of programs, fixed wing and SOF warrior systems comprise a large proportion (25 out of 35) of those that are not meeting original cost and schedule estimates. However, when viewed by the amount of funding allocated to these programs, fixed and rotary wing systems make up the majority ($1,844 million out of $2,521 million) that are not progressing as planned. The GAO was not able to put these results in context, that is, to compare them with DoD as a whole to determine whether USSOCOM’s performance was typical or atypical. This is primarily because of the fact that DoD does not keep aggregate performance data on ACAT III programs—which comprise most of USSOCOM’s acquisition portfolio.
Many of the fixed and rotary wing programs are the larger programs in USSOCOM’s portfolio, involving modifications to existing military-service or special-operations platform systems. As such, these programs require more systems engineering and design/integration efforts than other smaller programs being acquired by USSOCOM. For example, the estimated costs for USSOCOM’s fixedwing AC-130U 30 mm gun-modification program has increased 92 percent because of technical and design issues, and the program has been deferred until fiscal year 2008 when additional funding may be available. Likewise, the AC-130U+4 program, which is intended to modify the C- 130 aircraft into a side-firing gunship, has been delayed by seven months because of technical issues with the aircraft’s configuration and design.
Many of USSOCOM programs that are not progressing as planned are also programs in which the military departments are involved in a management capacity. Twenty-two of the 35 programs that have not stayed within original cost and schedule estimates have one of the military departments in a management role—either as the milestone decision authority or program manager or both. All of the fixed and rotary wing programs that are not progressing as planned are in this category. In contrast, however, USSOCOM does manage its five largest information and intelligence system programs, but they are not progressing as planned.
In assessing how programs have progressed, the GAO identified a small number of programs (8 out of 86) that USSOCOM canceled or deferred because of a need to fund higher priorities or because of technical issues encountered during development. Most of these programs were canceled early before significant funding and time were committed.
In the other few programs, however, significant time and effort was invested before they were canceled. For example, USSOCOM’s high-power fiber optic towed decoy program, which was being developed to provide a fiber optic towed decoy capability to USSOCOM’s fleet of AC- and MC-130 aircraft, was canceled after spending about $85 million because of higher funding priorities. USSOCOM’s one ACAT 1 program, the CAAP program was also subsequently terminated. The CAAP program, which was managed by the U.S. Air Force, was being designed to provide SOF-peculiar avionics capability to the U.S. Air Force’s avionics modernization program (AMP) on the MC-130H and AC- 130H/U aircraft. It was designed to give SOF-peculiar capabilities to the aircraft, including enhanced abilities to follow terrain and avoid detection while using Air Force-provided radar. However, USSOCOM terminated all funding for the CAAP program in its fiscal years 2008 to 2013 program objective memorandum. USSOCOM determined that it was cost prohibitive to continue the program after the Air Force ran into problems with the AMP program and determined that the cost to complete development of both AMP and CAAP would more than double the original estimates.
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
Addressing high-priority urgent needs from the field will continue to challenge USSOCOM’s ability to complete existing programs on time and within budget. In its roles in Iraq, Afghanistan and GWOT, USSOCOM will continue to fulfill urgent needs with acquisition programs. But because of the short time frames involved, funding for these programs is not built into the budget.
In the past five years, USSOCOM reallocated about $259 million from budgeted programs to fund almost 50 urgent deployment acquisitions. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, USSOCOM did begin to receive money from Congress in its budget— about $80 million and $22 million respectively—to help defray some of the costs of its urgent deployment acquisition programs.
According to USSOCOM’s Acquisition Executive, urgent deployment acquisitions are expected to continue over the next several years, and the command anticipates requesting about $20 to $25 million each year from 2008 to 2013 to help pay for these needs. Although funding shifts are disruptive in USSOCOM, as they are in the military departments, USSOCOM’s strategic planning structure for assessing and selecting programs is well-suited for making the trade-offs among priorities needed to address urgent needs.
USSOCOM also has difficulty tracking progress and addressing problems early in programs where it has delegated management authority to the military departments. Having access to all the military departments provides USSOCOM the means to leverage resources and expertise that may not reside at USSOCOM, such as program management, engineering and technical services, testing and evaluation support, and logistical support. However, in some cases when USSOCOM has relied on the military departments for technical or basic capabilities, its programs have been adversely affected when the department-provided capabilities are delayed. When delays occur, there tends to be a cascading effect on USSOCOM programs.
According to USSOCOM’s acquisition executive, although USSOCOM has over-arching memorandums of agreement establishing program management arrangements with each of the military departments, not all of the agreements are signed at the appropriate levels of authority within the military departments. While the agreement with the Army is signed by the Secretary of the Army, the Air Force and Navy agreements are signed by the chiefs of staff. This is a challenge to USSOCOM because acquisition and budget authority resides with the military department secretary and not with the chief of staff.
When problems occur in programs managed by the Air Force or Navy, USSOCOM may have less standing to make a case that they are not living up to the memorandums of agreement, than the command would with the Army. USSOCOM also acknowledges that memorandums of agreement for specific programs—particularly the larger, more complex programs USSOCOM delegates to the military departments—have not been detailed enough in terms of laying out the roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing programs, nor detailed enough in laying out how USSOCOM will be able to track progress and participate in regular program reviews with the military departments.
While written agreements by themselves may not result in better USSOCOM-military department programs, they are important in that they provide a foundation for effective program management. USSOCOM is currently taking steps to update the written agreements with the military departments and also examining whether some of its programs would be better under USSOCOM management.
MANAGEMENT APPROACH
USSOCOM employs elements of a knowledge-based acquisition approach, but it is not consistently applied. The GAO has frequently reported on the need to develop a solid, executable business case before committing resources to a new product development effort.
The GAO found that although USSOCOM has a systematic strategic planning process to prioritize and select programs, it has started some programs, particularly the larger and more complex programs, without ensuring that there was a solid match between the requirements and resources to complete the development. For example, USSOCOM terminated the CAAP program because of excessive cost growth resulting from technical problems and schedule delays with the Air Force’s AMP. While USSOCOM attributes the cause of program problems in part to poor contractor performance, it also acknowledges that technology challenges and development costs were significantly underestimated when the program started.
USSOCOM’s tool for managing its acquisition programs— called the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Information System (SOALIS)—lacks sufficient oversight and maintenance. At the time of the GAO review, it was found that information for most programs was out of date and that some programs had not been updated in years, even though the program executive officers and program directors are required to keep SOALIS accurate and up to date on at least a monthly basis.
Further, the report found no enforcement mechanism to ensure oversight of this important management tool. According to USSOCOM’s Standard Operating Procedures Directive, SOALIS is intended to give USSOCOM decision makers and stakeholders essential information on the status and progress of ongoing acquisition efforts. Although regular progress reviews take place on individual programs, the lack of up-to-date information on all programs can impede USSOCOM’s ability to conduct effective oversight.
USSOCOM WORK FORCE
USSOCOM’s acquisition work force has remained relatively small for many years, but plans are underway to increase the size of the acquisition work force about 75 percent by the end of 2008. This is being done to address the growth in acquisitions work that has taken place over the past several years as well as expected future growth in acquisitions with USSOCOM’s expanded role in the GWOT.
Since 2001, USSOCOM’s work force grown by only 10 positions to a total of 185 government—civilian and military—acquisition employees. USSOCOM plans to expand its governmental acquisition work force to about 300 employees. Currently, the governmental workforce is heavily supplemented by contractors. Specifically, contractors comprise about two-thirds of the overall work force supporting USSOCOM’s acquisition activities. The contractor support includes logistics, training, education and testing support, and engineering and technical services.
In order to prepare for the upcoming work force expansion, USSOCOM is conducting a manpower study. The study, which is scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2008, is designed to assess the composition of the work force and determine workloads associated with each USSOCOM position—including all acquisition positions—to aid USSOCOM officials in their placement of newly hired government employees. Also, to lower costs, USSOCOM’s acquisition executive anticipates a reduced reliance on contractors in conjunction with the expansion of the governmental acquisition work force.
Ninety-five out of the current civilian acquisition work force (129 filled positions) have attained DOD’s level III certification. The senior level civilian acquisition work force at the GS-14, GS-15 and senior executive service levels, along with those assigned to critical acquisition positions that require level III certification, have all earned level III certification.
The command has encountered challenges in filling vacancies in the upper-level, civilian-acquisition-work force positions. According to USSOCOM’s acquisition executive, the difficulty in hiring qualified personnel to fill these critical vacancies is due, in part, to the lengthy process required to hire qualified acquisition personnel. USSOCOM uses the Air Force personnel system as its executive hiring agency. However, this process has taken as long as 240 days to hire at the upper levels.
USSOCOM’s military acquisition work force certification rated at level III is not as high as its civilian counterparts. This is particularly true for critical acquisition positions, which usually involve significant supervisory or management responsibilities (e.g., program manager). About 40 percent of these positions are held by officers who do not meet the level III certification standards required by DoD.
One of the challenges USSOCOM faces in filling military acquisition positions is that the command often requires military operational experience and/or specialized skills. According to USSOCOM, Army and Navy policies require their acquisition officers to have operational assignments before being assigned to the acquisition career field, but officers in the Air Force do not have to gain prior operational experience.
In addition, some of the acquisition positions at USSOCOM require unique special operations experience. For instance, some of the Navy’s acquisition positions at USSOCOM are designated to be filled by Navy SEAL personnel, a group in short supply and generally not trained in acquisition. Since USSOCOM is reliant on the services to provide military acquisition personnel to the command, USSOCOM runs the risk of not being able to fill acquisition positions if it turns down candidates sent forward by the services who do not meet all the position requirements.
GAO RECOMMENDATIONS
Thus far, USSOCOM has done well with small acquisitions that modify readily available commercial technologies and nondevelopmental items. It has had more difficulty delivering the more complex systems that involve significant development and reliance on the military departments.
As USSOCOM prepares for more growth in its acquisition function to meet the expanding needs for special operations forces, it will be important for the command to leverage its experience into better results in the future. For those more complex acquisitions that must be undertaken, opportunities exist for USSOCOM to improve its results by ensuring that better business cases exist before embarking on such acquisitions, especially if they depend on acquisitions being managed by other military departments. In addition, the foundation for all acquisitions can be improved by (1) ensuring that the size and composition of the work force is a good match for the acquisition workload undertaken by USSOCOM and (2) having a sound management information system to track programs.
To better position USSOCOM to achieve the right acquisition program outcomes, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take the following three steps to ensure:
• USSOCOM establishes sound business cases for its more complex and military department-managed acquisition programs. Integral to this is applying the elements of a knowledge-based acquisition strategy (That is: programs match requirements with resources.) and having effective agreements in place with the military departments that specify clear roles, responsibilities, and expectations for executing programs.
• As USSOCOM increases its acquisition work force, it (1) obtains personnel with the skills and abilities needed for more complex acquisitions, (2) makes sure personnel meet DoD acquisition certification level requirements, and (3) has the ability to make the hiring process as efficient as possible.
• USSOCOM improves the accuracy, timeliness and usefulness of its acquisition management information system. To accomplish this, USSOCOM should (1) establish enforcement mechanisms to make sure program managers submit updated information on a regular basis and (2) conduct quality checks to make sure the information is reliable. ♦