Q: Has this eased the deployed SF rotations?

A: As you might expect, the answer is both yes and no. Growth in the operating forces will ease the number of combat rotations for ODAs and some SOTFs [special operations task forces]. However, the highest global demand is for AOBs, and they won’t see much of a break from either combat deployments or engagement missions in support of the GCCs. Separate from the growth, USSOCOM recently announced a change to how we will provide trained and ready
 CJSOTFs [combined joint special operations task forces]. The unitlevel deployments will be longer but reduce the overall deployed rate of group-level staff members. The same is true for the GSB in that they, too, will deploy longer yet be in “dwell” for significantly
longer periods.

At current demand, the standup of the fourth battalions will reduce the operations and deployment tempo for our busiest forces. Most groups are at less than a 1:1 deployed-to-dwell rate. We all know if the deployed-to-dwell ratio is less than 1:1, then the individual
DEPTEMPO is even less. Specifically, we still have enduring theater engagement missions and use the forces in dwell to support these missions. This takes both units and experienced personnel into noncombat environments for traditional capacity-building missions. The ODAs and AOBs are our primary engagement forces, so the growth in the tactical forces found in the fourth battalions will absolutely help reduce unit and individual DEPTEMPO.

We must remain vigilant, however, as we grow the force because the global demand for SF will not decrease anytime soon. We recently expanded our forces in Afghanistan to meet new operational realities. We cannot resource force demands in the non-CENTCOM AORs at the rate we would like. Specifically, AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM could use more SF to good effect. The point here is it is entirely possible that global demand can outstrip the current and future sustainable supply of SF, so we must stay engaged with the consumers of SF capabilities. The future challenge will be not allowing additive enduring missions to eat into the positive impacts and goodness derived from tactical force growth.

Q: Do you foresee any particular challenges as more forces transition from Iraq to Afghanistan?

A: The initial “challenge,” which is really a change to long-standing methods, will be encountered by the SF operating in Iraq. As with any transition, there will be many challenges to overcome, but all appear acceptable, manageable and surmountable. First and foremost, our security is assured by enhancing the capabilities of our Iraqi counterpart units. We were a bit ahead of the bow wave of change in the past two years with standing up special police and commando units that are quite capable of operating under the warrant-based operations construct with minimal USSOF assistance. As a result, our Iraqi counterparts’ operating tempo in Iraq has remained high under the changes brought about by Iraqi sovereignty since January 2009. Further, the mission success rate has increased with increased Iraqi proficiency, as have successful prosecution in Iraqi courts—both key aspects to a successful counterinsurgency campaign.

Second, we have operated seamlessly with conventional forces in most areas for a number of years. The decreased presence and density of conventional forces could put all SOF in increasingly remote areas, potentially increasing the tactical risks incurred by the staybehind forces. However, USSOCOM proactively worked with CENTCOM to ensure that the SOF remaining behind will have access to sufficient capabilities to enable CJSOTF operations and those of the Iraqis with whom we exclusively operate. We are satisfied that there will be sufficient fires, medevac, ISR, and other enablers remaining behind to support our forces working with the Iraqis. Finally, we have worked with the Army leadership and received approval for fielding the last version of Land Warrior [LW] before the program is terminated. We have modified the underlying communications architecture and LW capabilities to support remote area operations and use by widely dispersed forces. Specifically, we have extended the LW range with beyond line-of-sight communications and integrated it into the digital comms network found in the SF battalions. We are also looking at software adjustments to enable it to do much more than tactical command and control. As a result, our forces remaining in Iraq will have rapid access to a much wider range of enabling technologies and data they can pull forward to their remote and widely dispersed locations. We strongly believe this operating concept and technology will significantly enhance the capacity of small units working in remote and widely dispersed regions in the very near future.

While SF is not moving forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, we have sent additional forces to OEF to support the expansion of operations there. Given the fact we have been continuously operating in Afghanistan since 2001, we know the Afghan theater of operations is different in many ways than Iraq. The terrain calls for a broader range of mobility platform capabilities. The relatively undeveloped infrastructure impacts everything from transportation to tactics, and the terrain conspires to diminish long-range communications. The Afghan theater requires a much wider range of capabilities and advanced technologies to augment those capabilities.

The biggest challenge we will face in Afghanistan in the future will be the increased demand for the constrained resources. We persistently need vertical lift to get our Afghan counterpart units to many of the insurgent network locations with sufficient security, speed and surprise to have an effect. We recently received some much-needed help from our 160th SOAR brothers in this regard. We also have to share ISR and other critical enablers with an increasing density of coalition forces, which creates its own challenges.

Q: The M4 has been the primary individual SF weapon for some time now. Where is the SCAR project, and do you expect it will be the SF weapon down the road?

A: USSOCOM remains the PM on the SCAR. They have released [a limited number] of the weapons to USASOC and other components for low rate initial production use. Special Forces Command is the largest single user of the weapon within SOF, so we have a keen interest in ensuring the weapon is thoroughly and rigorously tested by the SF soldiers in the field. We have distributed limited quantities to most of the groups, and they are being used under multiple scenarios and conditions to better understand the qualities of the system. We receive periodic feedback on the weapons and any potential strengths or weaknesses as a result of the field user evaluations. Several adjustments have been made already as a result of the user feedback. The SOF chain of command has been very clear on the future of the SCAR. User confidence in the weapon is essential to its fielding and acceptance by the larger special operations community. I am confident and fully expect the SF operators will critically look at every aspect of the weapon, and it will on this basis that I forward the regiment’s SCAR recommendation to Lieutenant General [John F.] Mulholland and Admiral [Eric T.] Olson.

Q: Are you looking for ways to increase the firepower—mortars, small artillery pieces, etc.—the SF has integrated into its structure, or are you satisfied with the current levels and relying on the service components to provide that additional firepower when needed?

A: The services are doing a superb job providing firepower in support of SF fixed bases and SF operating with indigenous maneuver forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. I see no change in that relationship in the near term. The improvements we have seen in fire support over the past two years are the result of converging developments. On the SF side, we worked for several years to build the case for an organic fire support coordination capability at the group and battalion level. This has come to fruition due to the hard work of multiple senior leaders and the support of the field artillery community. Second, the fielding of the M777 155 mm howitzer and the Excaliber round has extended the large caliber artillery’s range, lethality and precision while lowering the collateral damage estimate of ground-based fires. Deployed Special Forces are using that capability extensively in Afghanistan with devastating effect. We see a continuing and increasing reliance on that system.

However, what is adequate now may be insufficient in other scenarios or in the irregular warfare operating environments of the future. In that regard, we have some emerging shortfalls in fire support. One area that needs improvement is fire support at the ODA level during operations in temporary sites and expeditionary locations. We continue to look for capabilities that can provide the ODA with firepower superiority when operating in remote locations, in small elements, and outside of the quickresponse umbrella of the service systems. Increased effect and precision with low CDE [collateral damage estimation] at the small unit level continues to be a high priority for force development and acquisition.

We do not envision small artillery pieces as part of the solution since that gets into a larger DOTMLPF [doctrine, organization,  training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities] problem that is not sustainable in the long term. An abundance of mortars in various calibers, however, has proved to be invaluable in every scenario from the initial entry operations of JSOTF-North in OIF, to fixed base and maneuver support in OEF. We currently do not have enough of these systems in the field, which is something my headquarters needs to remedy. Two direct fire solutions have been provided by SOCOM recently. The first is the vehicle-mounted MK-44 minigun, which provides immediate and devastating suppressive fires. Its psychological impact on the enemy cannot be overstated. The second is the lightweight grenade launcher with fire control system that provides highly accurate 40 mm fires. A future capability in which we are very interested is the non-line-of-sight launch system that is a Future Combat System spinout. That system has significant potential to provide precision, ground-based fire support that would be under SF control from fixed and secured bases. We have discussed getting this system fielded to our forces in the future.

Q: How well does the process of meeting urgent operational needs work as far as getting innovative gear to the warfighter quickly?

A: I have already mentioned two SOCOM successes: the MK-44 minigun and the lightweight grenade launcher system, but there are others as well. However, neither of these systems arrived overnight, nor did we acquire them without a bit of a bureaucratic process. Acquisition “at the speed of combat” is an inherently difficult process, and is pursued in a world that is process-oriented, vice outcome-oriented.

The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System [JCIDS] is designed to be a methodical, capabilities-based process to ensure the best solution is identified, refined, and injected into the POM [program objective memorandum] funding cycle. This does not always meet urgent operational needs for the operators on the battlefield.

We have also leveraged other forces’ operational needs processes to improve SF’s capabilities, such as adding the MRAPs to the vehicle fleets in Iraq and Afghanistan. Organizations like the Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office [CTTSO] and the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force [REF] have proved exceptional at bridging the capability gap between urgent need and the JCIDS-developed solution. These organizations’ charters allow them to work with a greatly condensed developmental cycle focused on operator input and feedback to fill the operational gap. CTTSO and REF have the critical ability to shift from the finely managed development process to a more flexible rapid development process. This does not mean that the best possible solution is identified using these entities. Rather, the 90 percent solution right now is sometimes sufficient for mission accomplishment, instead of waiting for a 100 percent solution that is two years too late. Both the CTTSO and REF excel at getting a 90 percent solution now.

Q: How are the ground mobility vehicles [GMVs] holding up? Do you believe that you will need new vehicles—either GMVs or new platforms all together—sooner rather than later?

A: The GMV has proved itself in combat for the past nine years as a workhorse for SF operations and a critical capability on the battlefield. The vehicle continues to perform beyond its original design, but it is a system based on decades-old technology. We’ve come a long way from the days of dragging old M-151s out of the PDO yard then modifying them for our purposes. The GMV of today has evolved through many product improvements based on the good ideas of our operators. There have been several versions of add-on armor protection to get to the current armored vehicle, and we have improved survivability by adding jammers and the gunner’s protection kits. We installed the Army’s FBCB2 [Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below] system for improved battlespace awareness, and we have made improvements to our communications systems. Other modifications, such as upgrades to the suspension system, motor and bumpers, have increased the vehicle’s overall functionality. Future improvements may include capabilities such as an unmanned gun platform.

Our mobility fleet also includes the SRATS [specialized reconnaissance assault transport system], RG-31, RG-33, and the MATV, provided by the Army through SOCOM, based on Operational Needs Statements [ONS] for the CJSOTFs. Our troops continue to provide us with new ideas to improve mobility, survivability and lethality. Eventually, advances in technology will lead to the replacement of the GMV with a lighter, more survivable and improved mobility solution for our forces.

Q: Now to unmanned systems. Has Special Forces determined the mix of unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs] it wants including various sizes of platform? Would you like to have direct access and control over your own armed fleet of UAVs?

A: Now and into the future, we need UAVs of various sizes, ranges and capabilities because of the different mission sets and environments in which SF conduct operations. The organic assets we choose will be smaller in size and employable at the ODA or ODB [operational detachments-Bravo] level. Capabilities provided by larger systems but with substantial logistical requirements are probably better obtained through external UAV support. We currently have or plan to field two Army systems: the Raven and the Shadow. The Raven, classified by the Army as a small unmanned aerial system [SUAS], is man-portable and hand-launched to meet ODA and AOB mission requirements for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition [RSTA] and battle damage assessment [BDA]. The second Army system, the Shadow, also meets requirements for RSTA and BDA missions, but provides limited coverage over a brigade-sized area. The Shadow’s range and sensor capabilities are insufficient in the long term for what we need.Currently, the Army does not have a program for micro or miniature UAVs, but USSOCOM is taking the lead in that realm with a requirement for a proximity outdoor miniature robotic air vehicle. Material solutions include the Wasp III or the Maveric, both hand-launched systems, with reduced signatures, enhanced target penetration characteristics, and require only one operator. These systems are used to quickly pass information back to tactical elements to increase situational awareness and missionplanning efficiency.

An SF group’s area of operation is comparable to that of an Army corps in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The immense geographical area, coupled with the growing need for UAS support for RSTA and target attack, has created an intense competition in theater for the Army’s extended range multipurpose [ERMP] UAS. The CJSOTF-A and CJSOTF-AP submitted two combat mission need statements in FY06 and FY07 for ERMP capability. The Army will provide an ERMP platoon as a quick reaction capability of four UAVs in FY10 in support of USASOC. SF requires either OPCON [operational control] or TACON [tactical control] of ERMP assets. Further, we see the extended range requirement as the norm, as we will operate or already are operating in places where SOF is the preponderance of forces. This is already the case in the Philippines and Trans Sahel, Africa. We will continue to require extended range and duration UAS well into the future, and the capability will continue to be imperative in irregular warfare scenarios.

Q: Are UGVs part of your future plans?

A: UGVs have potential application in future SF operations. Currently, the technology has not matured to the desired or practical level, so we are not engaged in pursuing UGVs. However, all SOF continue to evaluate new technologies for potential applications to our mission requirements. ♦

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