The 2007 United Nations Command Special Operations Forces Conference
Over 57 years ago, on June 25, 1950, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was invaded by a communist-sphere supported Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK, also known as North Korea (nK)), triggering the swift commitment of combat forces from 16 member nations of the United Nations (U.N.). Over one million U.N. troops from the various sending states, as they became known, coalesced into a combined fighting force with the ROK armed forces to drive the nK aggressors north of the 38th parallel in support of U.N.S.C. Resolutions 82, 83 and 84. Today, the U.N. continues its enduring commitment to the defense of the ROK each day in armistice, deliberately sustaining its readiness through regular exercises and engagements on the Korean Peninsula and being prepared to fight tonight.
A lesser known, but no less significant part of this continuing effort transpired September 10-14, 2007, on U.S. Army Garrison-Yongsan, in the heart of the bustling metropolitan city of Seoul, ROK. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR), commanded by Brigadier General Simeon Trombitas, hosted its sixth U.N. Command (UNC) Special Operations Forces Conference. The theme of the conference was “The Contributions of the United Nations Command to Unconventional Warfare in the Korea Theater of Operations.” Over 150 participants from 10 member nations engaged in this significant event, including notable scholars, experts, military leaders and key personnel from around the globe.
The UNC SOF Conference kicked off with a special tour to the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone (DMZ)—a stark reminder of the continuing U.N. security commitment here. Despite the entertainment value of seeing the one-hole location surrounded by minefields in the DMZ as what Sports Illustrated has labeled as the “World’s Most Dangerous Golf Course,” the otherwise sobering tour provided real evidence of what separates the two Koreas. Knowing that those on the other side of the military line of demarcation (MDL), which actually separates the two Koreas, have strong infantry, armor, and artillery units nearby helps clarify that nK wants to unify Korea under its version of communism and why U.S. forces are critical in deterring that threat. The U.S. government and military and have stood beside our South Korean allies to enforce that deterrence since the Korean War-ending armistice was signed in 1953. And although U.S. forces on the peninsula are undergoing a significant transformation, that commitment remains incredibly strong.
General B.B. Bell, the senior U.S. military officer in the ROK who is triple-hatted as commander of UNC, Combined Forces Command (CFC,) and U.S. Forces Korea, led the long list of distinguished conference speakers and in his opening remarks, noted that Korea is a single nation temporarily separated, albeit for far too long. His key points reinforced the paramount importance of deterrence and readiness, as well as the need to continuously strive to develop cooperation and capacity to conduct SOF missions on the peninsula. But should deterrence fail, the mission would be to fight quickly and decisively, combined with our ROK and other allies, to bring the war to an end on our terms. Another key point of Bell’s was how much the nK government relies upon their SOF—the largest such force in the world— and our requirement to better understand them and their capabilities. Bell’s words were instrumental in getting the conference off to a strong start.
Other presentations covered historical perspectives and doctrine of unconventional warfare (UW), nK dynamics (sociology, nK psychology, forces, etc.), and unique perspectives from U.N. sending states. The conference culminated with a presentation by the most senior nK defector, who was the chief architect of “Juche” (a.k.a. selfreliance), which still forms the dogma-like ideology central to nK. The variety and depth of topics supported the central theme of UW in Korea, touching on the diverse aspects and issues relevant to effectively employing a diverse coalition of SOF in future conflicts.
One significant concept which emerged during the conference was the differences in UW, as perceived by the broad array of international and multi-disciplinary participants. The academic community, in general, broadly defined UW amongst the realm of warfare that is other than conventional. On the other end of the spectrum, U.S. Army Special Operations Command doctrine, as explained by a U.S. Army Special Forces subject matter expert, more specifically defined UW as waging war “…by, through, and with irregular forces.” Australian and New Zealand doctrine, in comparison to the other views, essentially fell somewhere in between— involving more of an irregular or guerilla warfare flavor (as categorized by USASOC doctrine).
Another commonly shared impression that began to unfold during the conference was “patterns of conflict,” particularly during the brief analysis of historical examples and through U.N. sending state presentations. Numerous examples materialized in various discussions, demonstrating past failures and successes along with operational opportunities and analogies, and more importantly, valuable UW “lessons learned.” One such example came from a retired Colombian general and previous commander of the Colombian armed forces, who described this type of warfare from the viewpoint of a soldier and nation engaged in a hot counter-insurgency for more than 40 years. Another presentation, made by an officer of the Royal Thai Army, further illustrated the seriousness and ferocity of a developed insurgency within southern Thailand. By the end of the conference it was clear that a framework had developed, balanced with the historical and doctrinal perspectives from other experts, to decipher the basic foundation of an insurgency, and several of its key elements.
TAKEAWAYS FROM THE UNC SOF CONFERENCE
A lesser known, but no less significant part of this continuing effort transpired September 10-14, 2007, on U.S. Army Garrison-Yongsan, in the heart of the bustling metropolitan city of Seoul, ROK. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR), commanded by Brigadier General Simeon Trombitas, hosted its sixth U.N. Command (UNC) Special Operations Forces Conference. The theme of the conference was “The Contributions of the United Nations Command to Unconventional Warfare in the Korea Theater of Operations.” Over 150 participants from 10 member nations engaged in this significant event, including notable scholars, experts, military leaders and key personnel from around the globe.
The UNC SOF Conference kicked off with a special tour to the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone (DMZ)—a stark reminder of the continuing U.N. security commitment here. Despite the entertainment value of seeing the one-hole location surrounded by minefields in the DMZ as what Sports Illustrated has labeled as the “World’s Most Dangerous Golf Course,” the otherwise sobering tour provided real evidence of what separates the two Koreas. Knowing that those on the other side of the military line of demarcation (MDL), which actually separates the two Koreas, have strong infantry, armor, and artillery units nearby helps clarify that nK wants to unify Korea under its version of communism and why U.S. forces are critical in deterring that threat. The U.S. government and military and have stood beside our South Korean allies to enforce that deterrence since the Korean War-ending armistice was signed in 1953. And although U.S. forces on the peninsula are undergoing a significant transformation, that commitment remains incredibly strong.
General B.B. Bell, the senior U.S. military officer in the ROK who is triple-hatted as commander of UNC, Combined Forces Command (CFC,) and U.S. Forces Korea, led the long list of distinguished conference speakers and in his opening remarks, noted that Korea is a single nation temporarily separated, albeit for far too long. His key points reinforced the paramount importance of deterrence and readiness, as well as the need to continuously strive to develop cooperation and capacity to conduct SOF missions on the peninsula. But should deterrence fail, the mission would be to fight quickly and decisively, combined with our ROK and other allies, to bring the war to an end on our terms. Another key point of Bell’s was how much the nK government relies upon their SOF—the largest such force in the world— and our requirement to better understand them and their capabilities. Bell’s words were instrumental in getting the conference off to a strong start.
Other presentations covered historical perspectives and doctrine of unconventional warfare (UW), nK dynamics (sociology, nK psychology, forces, etc.), and unique perspectives from U.N. sending states. The conference culminated with a presentation by the most senior nK defector, who was the chief architect of “Juche” (a.k.a. selfreliance), which still forms the dogma-like ideology central to nK. The variety and depth of topics supported the central theme of UW in Korea, touching on the diverse aspects and issues relevant to effectively employing a diverse coalition of SOF in future conflicts.
One significant concept which emerged during the conference was the differences in UW, as perceived by the broad array of international and multi-disciplinary participants. The academic community, in general, broadly defined UW amongst the realm of warfare that is other than conventional. On the other end of the spectrum, U.S. Army Special Operations Command doctrine, as explained by a U.S. Army Special Forces subject matter expert, more specifically defined UW as waging war “…by, through, and with irregular forces.” Australian and New Zealand doctrine, in comparison to the other views, essentially fell somewhere in between— involving more of an irregular or guerilla warfare flavor (as categorized by USASOC doctrine).
Another commonly shared impression that began to unfold during the conference was “patterns of conflict,” particularly during the brief analysis of historical examples and through U.N. sending state presentations. Numerous examples materialized in various discussions, demonstrating past failures and successes along with operational opportunities and analogies, and more importantly, valuable UW “lessons learned.” One such example came from a retired Colombian general and previous commander of the Colombian armed forces, who described this type of warfare from the viewpoint of a soldier and nation engaged in a hot counter-insurgency for more than 40 years. Another presentation, made by an officer of the Royal Thai Army, further illustrated the seriousness and ferocity of a developed insurgency within southern Thailand. By the end of the conference it was clear that a framework had developed, balanced with the historical and doctrinal perspectives from other experts, to decipher the basic foundation of an insurgency, and several of its key elements.
TAKEAWAYS FROM THE UNC SOF CONFERENCE
1. Preparing in armistice (inside or outside Korea, pre-crisis) in order to harness the full spectrum of UNC SOF capabilities. Preparation, exercise and engagement, to rectify most of the basic problems during peacetime will maximize the effi ciency and effectiveness of the combined force. We will not have the time to resolve these issues after crisis erupts.
2. Exploiting synergy by effectively synchronizing the diverse experiences of forces as well as the unique skills and capabilities, quality and quantity which provide fl exibility to the commander. We need to focus towards achieving a common end state, rather than focusing on our differences, to capitalize on the strength in our diversity. The combined force, properly utilized, offers the potential of a broad range of practical solutions to an unpredictable environment. A good example of this was a New Zealand offi cer with Special Air Service combat service, who described their highly skilled combat tracker teams, demonstrated in combat since the Vietnam War. This capability has provided an effective means of pursuing the elusive foe (i.e., chasing ghosts, as one of the guest lecturers described guerillas) which melts into the terrain.
3. Managing limitations and unique attributes inherent within a diverse force, to maximize the total effect. Examples of these were aptly described by a senior offi cer from the Australian SAS Regiment, identifying and harmonizing the effect of “national caveats” (sending state rules of engagement (ROE), unique processes, etc.); maximizing information fl ow amongst the force—which could involve releasibility issues regarding intelligence and/or tactics, techniques and procedures; and ensuring C4I compatibility (i.e., procedures, processes, equipment, etc.). Of critical importance, when dealing with diverse national forces, is a robust translation capability and common language/terminology.
4. Ensuring SOF are employed in appropriate missions. The Australian offi cer also explained the concept of the “hydraulic effect” (i.e., applying SOF in an economy of force role for maximum gain or leverage), and other related principles which echo the USSOCOM SOF truths and operational SOF mission criteria. The historical analysis and sending state perspectives offered some excellent examples of how to effectively employ SOF for maximum effect.
5. Understanding the multifaceted nature of the enemy. Brigadier General Trombitas, who also serves as commander of the UNC special operations component (UNC SOCOMP) during crisis, explained in his opening remarks that “…key terrain, in UW, is the 6 inches between the enemy’s ears.” Sun Tzu’s well known principle of “…know thy enemy, and know thyself, then you will never face defeat in a thousand battles,” still rings true today. We need to guard against the continual threat of “mirror imaging” to defeat the enemy’s real vulnerabilities, rather than the convenient foe we conjure up.
2. Exploiting synergy by effectively synchronizing the diverse experiences of forces as well as the unique skills and capabilities, quality and quantity which provide fl exibility to the commander. We need to focus towards achieving a common end state, rather than focusing on our differences, to capitalize on the strength in our diversity. The combined force, properly utilized, offers the potential of a broad range of practical solutions to an unpredictable environment. A good example of this was a New Zealand offi cer with Special Air Service combat service, who described their highly skilled combat tracker teams, demonstrated in combat since the Vietnam War. This capability has provided an effective means of pursuing the elusive foe (i.e., chasing ghosts, as one of the guest lecturers described guerillas) which melts into the terrain.
3. Managing limitations and unique attributes inherent within a diverse force, to maximize the total effect. Examples of these were aptly described by a senior offi cer from the Australian SAS Regiment, identifying and harmonizing the effect of “national caveats” (sending state rules of engagement (ROE), unique processes, etc.); maximizing information fl ow amongst the force—which could involve releasibility issues regarding intelligence and/or tactics, techniques and procedures; and ensuring C4I compatibility (i.e., procedures, processes, equipment, etc.). Of critical importance, when dealing with diverse national forces, is a robust translation capability and common language/terminology.
4. Ensuring SOF are employed in appropriate missions. The Australian offi cer also explained the concept of the “hydraulic effect” (i.e., applying SOF in an economy of force role for maximum gain or leverage), and other related principles which echo the USSOCOM SOF truths and operational SOF mission criteria. The historical analysis and sending state perspectives offered some excellent examples of how to effectively employ SOF for maximum effect.
5. Understanding the multifaceted nature of the enemy. Brigadier General Trombitas, who also serves as commander of the UNC special operations component (UNC SOCOMP) during crisis, explained in his opening remarks that “…key terrain, in UW, is the 6 inches between the enemy’s ears.” Sun Tzu’s well known principle of “…know thy enemy, and know thyself, then you will never face defeat in a thousand battles,” still rings true today. We need to guard against the continual threat of “mirror imaging” to defeat the enemy’s real vulnerabilities, rather than the convenient foe we conjure up.
In conclusion, a combined/coalition special operations force—in Korea and elsewhere—most likely to involve the U.N., is a facet of military operations that is here to stay. The UNC, with its lasting commitment to the defense of the ROK, is an enduring example of the resolve and capability of a multi-national force. UNC special operations forces are our collective commitment to regional stability and deterrence. They serve as an agile, flexible and effective capability ready for employment by the UNC/CFC commander, offering a diverse range of solutions and capabilities, which provide a decisive advantage throughout the spectrum of conflict and all phases of the war plan. As the Australian officer warned, we need to “… avoid excessive force protection obsession...,” and constantly guard against the siege mentality we often cling to during armistice and wartime. This applies equally to both UNC SOCOMP and as a central philosophy to SOF: We will continue to be an effective fighting force only if our natural aversion to threat and discomfort (real and imagined, political and strategic) is deliberately overcome by a bold and methodical proactive engagement posture. We must learn from our collective knowledge and experiences, and resolve to continually engage the enemy, the people, our allies and partners…to achieve “hydraulic effects” and maintain a capable, cohesive fighting force in armistice. Our bottom line, on the Korean Peninsula, is to be ready to fight tonight. To do so, we must, as we say in “Korea, Kapshi Kapshida” (We go together)! ♦