Q&A: Brigadier General John F. Mulholland, Jr.
WARRIOR LEADER:
Enhancing Regional Partnerships and Coordinating the Fight on Terror

Brigadier General
John F. Mulholland, Jr.
Commander
Special Operations Command Central
Enhancing Regional Partnerships and Coordinating the Fight on Terror

Brigadier General
John F. Mulholland, Jr.
Commander
Special Operations Command Central
Major General John F. Mulholland Jr., assumed command of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) on June 22, 2007. Before taking command of all special operations forces in Central Command’s area of responsibility, he was the deputy commanding general of Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C.
Mulholland graduated from Furman University in 1978 with a bachelor’s degree in history and was commissioned there as a second lieutenant in the infantry. His first assignment was in Fort Clayton, Panama, from 1979 to 1980, where he served as a rifle platoon leader in Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 20th Infantry, 193rd Infantry Brigade. From 1980 to 1982, he was rifle platoon leader and weapons platoon leader in Company A (Airborne), 3rd Battalion, 5th Infantry in Fort Kobbe, Panama. In 1983, he completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and then graduated from the Special Forces Qualification Course. He then was assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (A) at Fort Bragg, where he served as Operational Detachment-A commander and a company commander from 1984 to 1986. Mulholland returned to Panama from 1987 to 1989, where he was appointed current operations officer and later exercises and ground operations officer in J-3 (Operations), Special Operations Command South, U.S. Southern Command.
He attended the Defense Language Institute and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College from January 1990 to June 1991.
From June 1991 to 1993, Mulholland served with 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A) at Fort Bragg as operations officer and later as an executive officer.
Following his tour with the 7th SFG (A), he served as an assistant operations officer, deputy operations officer, and operations officer with the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (A) until June 1996.
Mulholland commanded 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (A), U.S. Army Pacific Command in Torii Station, Japan, until June 1998. He then assumed a battalion-level command within the U.S. Army Office of Military Support in Washington, D.C., until August 2000 when he attended the National War College in Washington, D.C. He assumed command of 5th SFG (A) at Fort Campbell, Ky., in July 2001, and in October that year became commander of Task Force Dagger, Joint Special Operations Task Force North during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. He later served as commander of Coalition-Joint Task Force West and then Coalition-Joint Task Force-Arabian Peninsula during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In August 2003, he was assigned as Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. From August 2005 through July 2006, Mulholland served as commanding general, U.S. Army Special Forces Command (A). From August 2006 until June 2007, he Mulholland served as deputy commanding general, Joint Special Operations Command.
Mulholland’s military awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Joint Service Achievement Medal, Army Achievement Medal, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Valorous Unit Award, Special Forces and Ranger tabs, Combat Infantryman and Expert Infantryman Badges, Pathfinder Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, and Military Freefall Parachutist Badge.
Q: A great number of our coalition partners have special operations forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan. What are some of the biggest take aways from the current operations on coordinating with coalition special operations forces?
A: The major coalition SOF contributors in Afghanistan are the Romanian SOF contingent and the UAE.
Romanian SOF have provided support to MEDCAPs [medical civic action programs] and DENTCAPs [dental civic action programs] throughout RC West. Mainly ROMSOF medical personnel support these missions.
The UAE has provided over $9 million to humanitarian assistance missions during this past year and over $34 million total assistance to the Afghan people.
Some of their recent projects include the building of over 200 residential homes in the Kabul area and the construction of The University of Khowst which has been recently completed and is scheduled to open in next month. Currently the UAE is working on constructing multiple Mosques in support of the Afghan Commando program, the end state being one mosque per commando location.
Q: Among special forces in the region, how would you characterize the relationship with Jordanian Special Operations Command? Do you share similar relationships throughout the region?
A: The Jordanians continue to provide a showcase example of the special operations relationships in the CENTCOM area of responsibility [AOR]. Our long-standing efforts to train special operators in Jordan have been a great benefit for both the Jordanian Special Operations Command and our own special operations forces. This vital partnership goes far to promote our political and security interests in the region. Similar relationships are being developed in a number of other countries within the AOR.
Q: Can you tell me about the training of the Iraqi and Afghani special operations forces [or commando forces]? How would you rate their growth along the capability curve and their ability to perform independent operations?
A: The focus of coalition special operations right now is to ensure that there is a collective synergy with the Afghan Ministry of Defense and fielded forces. Close coordination between NATO’s International Security Assistance Force [ISAF], the Ministry of Defense and the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan remains critical as we combine our efforts towards the same objectives. As Afghan forces become more established and capable, it will be imperative that our coalition special operations forces develop solid partnerships so we move forward together.
As always, a key objective is to deliberately enable and empower the Afghan forces to eventually plan and conduct operations independently. Coalition special operations forces provide valuable mentorship and training through close partnership with Afghan units. The Afghan National Army Commandos are an excellent example of progress in this area, as they are taking increased responsibility in certain areas of the country. They have shown initiative and proven their effectiveness on the battlefield under the mentorship of SOF mentors and trainers.
The same objective is true for Iraqi forces. We build capability through close partnerships with Iraqi SOF and SWAT forces. Our partnership begins from the stand up of a new unit, through that unit’s training and certification, and ultimately to responsible, effective, independent operations. This is our operational construct.
Our primary partner in Iraq is the Iraqi Special Operations Force [ISOF] Brigade. The ISOF Brigade has made significant improvements over the past year and is capable of independent operations at the battalion level with U.S. SOF advice, assistance, and enablers. They have proven themselves as the most professional and competent Iraqi Force and they’ll continue to improve the overall security situation in Iraq. We are in the process of expanding the ISOF Brigade with four additional regional commando battalions (RCBs), providing an additional ISOF capacity throughout Iraq.
In addition to the ISOF Brigade, SOCCENT forces are partnered up with Iraqi Police elements, forming Iraqi special weapons and tactics (ISWAT) units in nine Iraqi provinces. These ISWAT units provide a provincial counterterrorist capability to react to threats throughout the provinces. The current capability varies among the different ISWAT units, with some in the initial stages of development, and others fully capable with U.S. assistance and enablers. As the ISWAT program develops, we see the units taking on a primary role as first responders at the local level.
In Afghanistan our main effort is the training of Afghan Commandos. As I’ve said, our Commando program has been extremely effective. We continue to steadily improve the screening, training and employment of Commando candidates. The Commando program is an excellent place to showcase the progress Afghanistan has made towards establishing functional and effective forces to provide for their own security. These enhanced light infantry units are doing great things in Eastern Afghanistan, and are beginning to independently plan and conduct their own operations.
Q: Where in the process is the restructuring of CENTCOM/SOCCENT to move the Horn of Africa into AFRICOM/AFRISOC?
A: Over the past year three mission transfer conferences have occurred between AFRICOM and the supporting combatant commands and their components. Several more of these planning conferences are scheduled for the remainder of this fiscal year to facilitate a positive mission transfer and the stand-up of AFRICOM Component Commands. SOCCENT is currently working with USCENTCOM to transfer specific missions, activities, plans and programs to SOCAFRICA, the future SOF component command of AFRICOM. SOCCENT and SOCARFICA staff members will ensure a seamless transition of our current command and control element in the Horn of Africa to SOCAFRICA.
Q: USSOCOM has been on the receiving end of a few MRAP trucks? In general terms, do you think that heavier, armored vehicles have a long term place with special forces?
A: In general terms, I would say that the heavier armored vehicles certainly have a long term utility for certain types of special operations missions. Special operations often seeks a delicate balance between maintaining a small footprint, mobility and armor. There are some missions that require a level of mobility and discretion that can make larger armored vehicles impractical.
Q: Although no SOF V-22s are in theater, have any of your people had any operational experience on the MV-22s there?
A: To my knowledge the SOF variant of the Osprey, the CV-22, has not been used operationally. I believe the MV-22 is currently being used by conventional Marines in Iraq.
Q: There have been some transformational changes with the SOF training pipeline in recent years. U.S. SOF has also been growing. With the combination of these two elements, have you noticed any differences in the warriors that are coming out of the pipeline more recently?
A: I can not speak to the level of training for the entire U.S. SOF community. However, I am very proud of the warriors that I have the opportunity to work with in the USCENTCOM AOR. The quality of these warriors and the tactics they employ to accomplish their missions are world class. ♦




