Q&A: Admiral Eric T. Olson
Written by Jeff McKaughan
SOF LEADER:
Directing, Supporting and Maintaining the World's Best SOF
Admiral Eric T. Olson
Commander
United States Special Operations Command
Directing, Supporting and Maintaining the World's Best SOF
Admiral Eric T. Olson
Commander
United States Special Operations Command
Admiral Eric T. Olson is the eighth commander of USSOCOM headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide.
A native of Tacoma, Wash., Olson graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1973 and qualified as a Naval Special Warfare officer in 1974. He has served operationally in an underwater demolition team, SEAL team, SEAL delivery vehicle team, special boat squadron, and at the Naval Special Warfare Development Group. He has commanded at every level from SEAL platoon officer-in-charge to Naval Special Warfare force commander.
Olson has participated in several conflicts and contingency operations, and has served as a SEAL instructor, strategy and tactics development officer and joint special operations staff officer. His overseas assignments include service as a United Nations military observer in Israel and Egypt, and as Navy programs officer in Tunisia. He served on the Navy staff as assistant deputy chief of naval operations (plans, policy and operations).
Olson earned a Master of Arts degree in national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and studied both Arabic and French at the Defense Language Institute. He is a joint specialty officer and political-military affairs sub-specialist with emphasis on Africa and the Middle East. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal and Silver Star.
Olson was interviewed by SOTECH Editor Jeff McKaughan.
Q: What priorities have you established for the command?
A: Every commander is responsible for stating his priorities, and I break it down into mission, people and equipment. The mission is the reason for the people and the equipment. The people are the primary capability for executing the mission, and the equipment is what we give the people to enable them to do the difficult things that we ask them to do around the world.
I have three main priorities, and I’ve divided each into three sub-areas. My first priority, Mission, is to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats. To support this priority, I focus on planning and conducting special operations, emphasizing culturally attuned engagement, and fostering interagency cooperation.
My second priority, People, is to develop and support our people and families. To do this, I focus a lot of our efforts on providing quality care and programs for our people and families, and training and educating our “joint warrior/diplomats.”
My third priority, equipment, is to sustain and modernize the force. To do this, I focus on equipping the operator, upgrading SOF mobility, and obtaining persistent intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms to support our SOF warriors in the field.
In my view, “culturally attuned engagement” and “interagency cooperation” are up in priority one for a very good reason. We understand that the conflict in which we are engaged is not going to be resolved by United States Special Operations Command alone, no matter what my authority for synchronizing plans in the global war on terror. It’s bigger than the Department of Defense. It’s bigger than government. It requires a global effort to address this. I can’t take responsibility for the global effort, but what I can do is encourage both international and interagency cooperation and collaboration in taking on that threat.
Priority number two is very dear to us. People who come into special operations tend to stay for a longer period of time. They grow up in special operations. They get to know each other, which is important for speed of response to crises. It’s important to understand each other’s capabilities and limitations. Those personal relationships that develop over time are very important, and we need to nurture that. We need to sustain these people and their families so they will continue their service at the high level of intensity that we ask them for a long period of time.
I’ll give you a little explanation on the next one. “Train and educate the joint warrior/diplomat” means training and educating the warrior and training and educating the diplomat. Training and education are about learning skills and knowledge. Warrior is pretty self-explanatory. Diplomat is less so. When I first created these priorities, I didn’t know what word to put there because diplomat didn’t sound quite right, but I couldn’t think of a better word. The more I thought about it, the more I liked it.
We really are American diplomats of the world, whether other people want to admit it or not. We are in places where other agencies of government will never go. We meet people they will never meet. We become the lens through which a lot of people in the world view the United States. And so I want to remind people that every day they do serve as diplomats.
Sustain and modernize the force. This is an authority granted to the commander of Special Operations Command, unlike any other combatant commander of the world. As the commander, I’m provided an acquisition executive, and head of agency authorities for research and development and acquisition. Major Force Program-11 funds are provided by Congress to the commander of Special Operations Command for the purpose of acquiring materiel, supplies, services and people who are specific to the special operations requirements. I’m exploring whether or not I’m operating on the edge of those authorities or comfortably within them. My sense is that I’m operating comfortably within them and I’m on a quest this year to determine how close to the edge I can get.
Q: Will you please explain the USSOCOM’s mission to plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks?
A: SOCOM’s mission is to provide fully capable special operations forces to defend the United States and its interests; and to plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.
This is a two-part mission statement and it shows the unique role of Special Operations Command. We provide fully capable special operations forces to serve operational commanders worldwide. We are a force provider in a large sense, very much like a military service. I’m responsible for organizing, training, equipping and deploying from the United States special operations forces to work globally for operational commanders around the world.
Usually, those operational commanders are special operations officers. Sometimes, they are not. When they are members of special operations, those commanders often work for somebody who’s not. So in that sense, I am a provider of a capability to answer global needs. And we plan and synchronize operations against terrorist networks.
That is a task assigned to the commander of Special Operations Command since 2005, codified in the Unified Command Plan. What it says is that, The United States Special Operations Command is the lead combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, conducting Department of Defense operations against terrorist networks globally, not just special operations, but Department of Defense Operations against terrorist networks. So that’s a significant responsibility for us in a global war on terror.
But we don’t really do that. What we really do is synchronize plans and planning in the global war on terror. We don’t synchronize specific operations or activities. It’s up to the operational commanders to do that. The operational commanders are responsible for executing the plans. But we at Special Operations Command receive, review and coordinate the plans; deconflict, collaborate and prioritize them, match them against needs around the world. Then, we make recommendations to the Joint Staff and the secretary of defense on how resources ought to be allocated around the world to match the demands of the global war on terror.
In that sense, we synchronize operations through synchronization of the plans; we are not directing operations. We prioritize, guide, review and recommend how resources will be allocated against the terrorist threat that faces us.
When I say prioritize, we’re prioritizing countries of the world in terms of their importance in a global war on terror. We track 200 independent nations of the world and we rank them one through 200. A country is high on the list, mostly because it is a place from which a significant threat emanates, but it can move up the list because it also has the potential to be a powerful partner.
We prioritize whether or not the threats in the Philippines are more important, or more urgent, than those in Columbia, or more important than the southern cone of South America, or the Trans-Sahara, more important than Iraq or Afghanistan or the Gulf of Guinea or other areas of the world. We prioritize these activities so that resources can be appropriately applied against current threats in those areas. While we don’t direct the allocation of resources, we make recommendations.
Q: Will you please explain the plan USSOCOM developed for DoD to meet the new mission?
A: The Department of Defense has laid out a campaign plan for a global war on terror. By saying that it’s the Department of Defense campaign plan, that says two things. It says the plan has authority within the Department of Defense and it has influence beyond the Department of Defense. It is also the Department of Defense supporting plan for the National Implementation Plan, which is meant to draw together the planning efforts of the other agencies of government.
What this says is that in order to get at the enemy—by getting at the enemy, I mean isolating the threat, defeating that threat and then preventing reemergence of that threat in that environment—you start with a friendly network. We’ve called it the Global Combating Terrorism Network. This is really a loosely organized affiliation of people, organizations and capabilities that are connected by a common desire to contribute to a global environment that is inhospitable to terrorist activity.
Some of these organizations are very obvious, like military units who are charged with a counterterrorism mission. Some are much less obvious, like global corporations who depend on stability for economic growth. Some of them are in-between, such as coalition forces in partnership with us. Or they could be intermediary organizations or non-governmental organizations. For all these organizations, a global environment that is inhospitable to terrorist activity is in their interest.
There are two main approaches by which this friendly network can have an effect on the enemy. We’ve called them the direct approach and the indirect approach. I’ll talk about the direct approach first.
The direct approach is largely military led. It is largely kinetic, chaotic, violent in nature. The two lines of operation in the direct approach are to disrupt violent extremist organizations, and to deny access and use of weapons of mass destruction by violent extremist organizations. Disrupting violent extremist organizations means to capture or kill their leaders, disrupt their infrastructure, interrupt their ability to train and finance their operations. By denying access and use of weapons of mass destruction by violent extremist organizations; organizations which have declared their intent to do that and use those against us, we’re using the direct approach again. This is primarily military in nature, and largely the responsibility of the Department of Defense. We consider the direct approach to be important, urgent and necessary, but not decisive. It is a holding action that buys time for the indirect approach to have its decisive effect.
The indirect approach enables partners to combat violent extremist organizations, deters tacit and active support for those organizations and those nations that are either less willing or less capable of doing it on their own, and erodes the root causes of extremist ideologies. The indirect approach takes a lot longer to show its effects. In the end, these actions will create enduring success. In order to give the indirect actions time to work, it takes a lot of direct action.
For direct actions, the military is clearly in the lead. While it’s not our responsibility to lead indirect actions, it is our responsibility to support them. Much of the capacity to conduct these kinds of operations, such as "train and assist" or "humanitarian assistance" operations, resides within the Department of Defense. We understand the balance between the two has to be very, very carefully executed.
It’s tempting to try to categorize people or units or capabilities into being either direct in their approach or indirect in their approach. Often it’s impossible to tell the difference between the two. The same unit can be doing both approaches, even simultaneously, as we’re doing when we train with, and then fight with, Iraqi and Afghan counterparts, which looks an awful lot like we’re attacking targets and disrupting violent extremist organizations. But the end result is enabling our partners to deal with their own problems, so that, ultimately, we can withdraw. This occurs all the time and it is, to a large degree, defining what special operations is becoming in this new world.
Q: What is the impact of the current OPTEMPO, and what do you think USSOCOM’s future OPTEMPO will be like?
A: The force is in really good shape. The operational commanders of my force are convinced that they’re sustaining this very, very well. Recruiting is high. Retention is high. We’re not demonstrating the same sort of traumatic effect on our force that some of the other forces are demonstrating, and I think that much of that has to do with the maturity of our people and the high level of training that they get.
My sense is that as the United States begins to draw down conventional forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will not lead into a reduction of demand for special operations forces. In fact, I think it’s going to lead to an increase in demand. As the environment shifts from one of occupation and combat to one that’s more “train and assist” and “stabilize and reconstruct,” it turns out that we’re in demand on both ends. And I think as brigade combat teams start to pull out, we’ll see an increased demand for special forces to come in and fill some of the voids that are created.
I’d like to see special operations get in the business of training foreign special operations forces a little bit more, and in the business of training new recruits in a foreign country how to march in straight lines and shoot on seven-meter ranges a little bit less. But I think the reality is that, given the skills to which special operations trains, the global demand will still be mostly for us. I can’t predict a balance, but I do think that the demand for special operations, globally, will continue to go up.
So we’re sustaining the force all right but, personally, I’m convinced there’s a future fragility for which we need to prepare. What’s good for five or six or seven years of operations isn’t necessarily good for 15 or 16 or 17 years at the same pace of operations. Although there are a number of programs in the Department of Defense and in each of the services that address physical or psychological trauma once it’s been manifested, there are fewer that get in the business of predicting and preventing that kind of trauma from occurring. So we’ve actually got some pretty good programs just getting underway in special operations to deal with that, especially the SOF Care Coalition.
Q: What future challenges will USSOCOM face?
A: There are a number of challenges USSOCOM is facing and will face in the coming years. The two largest categories the challenges fall into are personnel and equipment.
Operational commanders have learned no other force can accomplish as broad a scope of missions in so many diverse operational environments. So global demand for special operations forces does exceed supply, and I anticipate no decrease in the future.
As a result of program decisions made the last few years, including the QDR and last POM cycle, we are expanding SOF as fast as we reasonably can. I estimate 3 to 5 percent growth per year is about right for special operations forces manpower.
It is critically important that we maintain the quality of the SOF operator and high standards we have set for the SOF community.
As we grow the force, the ability to identify and recruit the best SOF candidates is a challenge requiring innovation and commitment of resources. Diversity across the force is an operational necessity which poses additional challenges to recruiting.
With support from the services, the SOF community has leveraged a combination of innovative accession programs, revamped training programs and implemented retention incentives. All three of these are crucial to our ability to grow the force.
Obtaining and maintaining SOF-unique equipment is also a challenge we are facing.
Many of the mobility platforms and much of the equipment used by special operations forces are initially procured by the services and then modified for special operations’ peculiar mission requirements. So most of Special Operations Command acquisitions programs must be carefully synchronized with the services. Recapitalizing our fixed-wing transport fleet and our intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capability in terms of systems, not just platforms, are our most critical needs. For these and other programs that deliver special operations-peculiar items, speed of process is essential, and I’m committed to exploring the scope of my authorities in order to make that system more responsive.
We continue to sustain and modernize the venerable SOF C-130 fleet. We will soon experience the degradation of that fleet because of the center wing box issue that has struck the entire C-130 fleet.
We have engaged with the Department of the Air Force to develop strategies for replacing and modernizing the aging MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130P Combat Shadow fleets. As an interim solution, four of 12 planned MC-130W air refueling tankers have been delivered, with four more scheduled for delivery in 2008. The eight aircraft will help to partially offset those MC-130Es and MC-130Ps. Four CV-22 trainer aircraft and the first three operational CV-22 Ospreys were delivered in 2006 and 2007. Three additional aircraft will to be delivered in 2008, with initial operational capability projected for February 2009.
USSOCOM rotary wing programs, in partnership with the U.S. Army, are providing the latest technologies and sustainability upgrades to the current SOF rotary wing fleet.
The CV-22 Osprey is our next generation rotary-wing lift, at least for the Air Force component of special operations. We have an inventory of eight and building towards an inventory of 50 CV-22s. In my view, the plan is delivering aircraft to us at too slow a rate. There are opportunities in the production line to accelerate delivery and we are seeking funding to do that.
Sensor systems that provide persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance are essential elements of USSOCOM’s operations and force protection. USSOCOM has been swiftly fielding persistent ISR capabilities within budgetary constraints and respective service training program limitations. We have modified existing SOF equipment where available, procured additional manned and unmanned ISR platforms, and partnered with the military departments, Defense Research and Engineering Directorate and the Joint IED Defeat Organization to cooperatively field additional sensors. But we do not have sufficient capacity for persistent ISR.
USSOCOM acquired and uses a combination of several manned and unmanned airborne ISR assets to provide the necessary flexibility for supporting the dynamic SOF mission set. Unmanned aerial systems continue to be powerful force multipliers for SOF activities and a key component of almost every operation. The micro unmanned aerial systems, the long-endurance Predatorclass systems, and the potential ultra-long-endurance unmanned aerial systems, such as the Global Observer JCTD, are platforms that provide force protection to small SOF units and aid in the identification and tracking of individual targets and items of interest.
Right now our most severe shortfall in the ISR system is manpower. There are not enough trained system operators or trained intelligence analysts to evaluate and distribute the information that is gathered through the surveillance.
Lastly, I believe that resolving the challenges regarding force allocation for irregular warfare is very important. Questions remain regarding roles and missions that will ultimately determine investment in IW capabilities. USSOCOM looks forward to participating in Defense Department efforts related to this issue. ♦